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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) promised to
protect older workers from discriminatory exclusion from the workforce,
but recent studies show that older workers are being cut from the
workforce and are unable to find employment.' In a 1995 article, I
warned of the potential dangers of construing the ADEA to allow
employment decisions based on age-correlated criteria.2 Most courts
have failed to heed these warnings and now approve employer practices,
such as terminating employees based on higher salaries and refusing to
hire workers with too much experience.' These practices may explain the
difficulty older workers are having retaining current employment and
obtaining new employment, which is exactly what the ADEA was
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law; B.A., University of Texas at Austin,
1969; J.D., University of Mississippi, 1974. I would like to thank Deborah Challener, Elizabeth Jones,
Matthew Steffey, Mark Modak-Truran, and Carol West for editorial assistance and Joanna Gomez for
editorial and research assistance.
i. See Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The i99os Version of Age and
Pension Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGs LJ. 511, 512, 516-18 (1997) (positing that
employers are using downsizing to exploit "the vulnerable position of a late-career employee who
cannot easily leave the relationship due to factors such as job-specific training.., employment and
pension benefits linked to seniority, and familial and community ties").
2. Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for Age Discrimination: Twilight of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE
L. REV. 1 (1995).
3. Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's Been,
Where It is Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 693-96 (i997). Professor Howard Eglit's
excellent article analyzed the ADEA after thirty years. He cited studies in which greater age was
viewed negatively. In one study, pairs of resumes were sent out, identical in all respects except for the
age of the applicant; one applicant listing his age as thirty-two; the other as fifty-seven. The older job
applicant was 26.5% less likely to receive a favorable response. Similarly, nearly five out of ten




When Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, it was concerned about
the number of displaced older people in the workforce who were unable
to find employment because of age-based discrimination.' In these days
of corporate downsizing and emphasis on the "bottomline," older people
are often considered the most expendable, especially when they can be
6
replaced by younger people, making less money.
The principal problem, according to current scholarship, is the
supposition by employers that older workers are less productive because
they often make more money than their younger counterparts. This is
explained by some economists in terms of a life cycle of productivity, that
workers are overpaid when first hired, and that when they gain
experience, they are underpaid. When they have been in the workforce a
long time, they are overpaid again because they are paid more than
similarly performing workers who have been in the workforce less time.'
Some authors label employers "opportunistic" when they terminate late-
career workers, thereby reaping the benefit of having underpaid the
worker at an earlier point in his career. s These opportunistic terminations
cause problems the ADEA was designed to prevent.
In terms of expectations, workers expect to make more money as
they get older. Employers find it economically expedient to increase
salaries of younger workers to retain them. The problem is that if the
employer succeeds in retaining the employee past middle age, the
employee becomes less mobile and less employable.' It is probably not
possible to change the expectation that one's salary will continue to rise,
nor is it likely that the ADEA will be amended to prohibit opportunistic
firings.
In any event, the life cycle of productivity is a generalization about
older employees that may not be borne out in a particular situation.
4. Id. at 604. Professor Eglit concluded that the age of the ADEA claimant is declining because
the layoff rate of younger ADEA protected workers has increased dramatically.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2oo0). Congress noted:
(i) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves
disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment
when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become
a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage
of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant
deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages,
high among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their employment
problems grave.
Id. § 62 1(a).
6. See Minda, supra note i, at 547-48.
7. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 789 (1997).
8. Id. at 790.
9. See Minda, supra note i, at 512.
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There is another view of whether a worker with more experience is
receiving an "'efficient wage'.... The older employee may be more
productive by reason of his greater experience, or he may be paid a
higher wage either to discourage shirking in his last period of
employment or as a reward.., for not having shirked previously."'
One author suggests that other factors may be at work in some
downsizing operations that affect older workers, such as impressing
investors and raising stock prices."
In today's corporate board rooms, it is the unrestrained
"bottom line" corporate decision-making tied to share price
that drives the effort to downsize older workers. Because
executive compensation is frequently tied to stock values and
quarterly profit (or loss) margins today, executives in positions
of power make labor relations decisions on the basis of the
"bottom line;" that is, whether or not the decision will enhance
the shareholders' investment by increasing stock prices through
positive profitability figures....
What is missing in the stock portfolio analysis is a realistic
assessment of the relative productivity of workers who have
firm-specific skills because of their long service with the
firm.... In failing to ascertain if older workers are in fact paid
an "efficient" wage, corporate decision-makers have utilized a
cost containment rationale to cover an age discriminatory
motive. 2
Even assuming that older workers are "overpaid," we must ask
ourselves what kind of society we want. Do we want a society in which
everything is justified by economic efficiency and other human values are
ignored? In fact, the anti-discrimination acts did take into account the
morality of discrimination in forbidding it. Making older workers
expendable, even if justified in terms of economic efficiency, cannot be
justified in terms of morality or in terms of the cost to society of
promoting a culture in which workers fear being terminated because they
no longer justify their higher salaries. Furthermore, "[t]here is a price-a
cost-for securing more important remedial and social objectives."'3
so. Id. at 529 (quoting RicHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 336-37 (I996)).
i. Id. at 525.
12. Id. at 549-50.
13. Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REV. 229, 231-32 (i99o). For example, customer
preference is not a defense in discrimination cases, despite profitability. Id. at 232. "[D]iscrimination,
at least in the short term, is not always economically irrational. According to economists, an employer
might find forbidden criteria attractive, even if only crudely predictive of productivity needs, because
they are relatively convenient and cheap to administer." Id. at 239. For example, the bona fide
occupational qualification (or "BFOQ") defense under both the ADEA and Title VII requires the
employer to suffer some economic detriment rather than use a facially discriminatory policy. Id. at
243-45. Similarly, the ADEA forbids mandatory retirement at any age for most jobs. See discussion
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The solution I am proposing contains two components that, working
together, could help deter opportunistic terminations and the use of
other age-correlated factors that exclude older workers from the
workforce. One component to the solution is to apply the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA, which would require an employer to justify
the use of an age-correlated factor that would have a disparate impact on
older workers. The employer's justification would implicate the second
component of the solution, the ADEA's defense of "reasonable factors
other than age" (hereinafter RFOA).'4 Whether the case is based on
disparate impact or disparate treatment, the employer should be
required to bear the burden of persuasion that the use of an age-
correlated factor that selects out older workers, such as high salary, is
justified as a "reasonable factor other than age." While this is not a
perfect solution, it is the only likely one. Unfortunately, because of
recent developments in the law, courts are generally not applying either
component of the proposed solution. The Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari to decide whether the disparate impact theory applies
to the ADEA," so whether that part of the solution will be a viable
vehicle for protecting older workers will soon be authoritatively
determined.
The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories of discrimination to define the scope of discrimination
prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).'6
Disparate treatment is the theory of discrimination implicated when the
employer has intentionally treated an employee differently because of
his membership in a protected class.'7 The disparate impact theory does
not require proof of intentional discrimination, but rather proof that an
employer has used a criterion that adversely impacts the protected class
and cannot be justified by business necessity."
It was inescapable that both theories of discrimination would apply
to the ADEA because Congress used the same language prohibiting
discrimination in the ADEA'9 that it had used in Title VII. The only
notable difference is that Title VII prohibits discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, color and national origin.0 The courts applied both
theories of discrimination to the ADEA until I993, when the Supreme
Court decided Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins.' Before Hazen Paper, if an
infra accompanying notes 135 & 144.
14. See infra Section II.
15. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3 d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S.
Mar. 29, 2004) (No. 03-I i6o).
16. See infra Section V.A.i.
I7. See discussion infra accompanying notes 158-67.
i8. See discussion infra accompanying notes 63-66.
19. See infra Section H.
20. Id.
21. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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employer used criteria such as high salary, seniority, tenure or too much
experience to make unfavorable employment decisions, courts generally
either found that the employer was discriminating per se under the
disparate treatment theory or required the employer to justify the use of
such factors that adversely affected older workers under the disparate
impact theory." As noted earlier, the Supreme Court will determine
shortly whether this situation will continue. 3
In Hazen Paper, the Court held that if the employer discharged the
plaintiff because his pension was about to vest, that action, standing
alone, did not constitute age discrimination. 4 The Court specifically
noted that the case did not involve disparate impact and only addressed
the question of whether age-correlated factors are discriminatory per se
under the disparate treatment theory."5 Nevertheless, lower courts have
interpreted Hazen Paper to approve an employer's explicit use of age-
correlated factors. These courts hold that either the disparate impact
theory does not apply to the ADEA or that age-correlated factors are no
longer probative at all of disparate treatment. 6 Courts are thus
employing Hazen Paper to disembowel the ADEA by allowing
employers to use age-correlated factors with impunity.
The second component of the proposed solution involves the proper
application of RFOA by requiring the employer to prove that the use of
an age-correlated factor that selects out older workers is justified as a
"reasonable factor other than age." Currently, the lower courts are
misinterpreting the Hazen Paper case and the RFOA defense by holding
that the use of "any" factor other than age, even a strongly age-
correlated factor, does not have to be justified and does not violate the
ADEA.2 However, RFOA can only be interpreted to allow the
employer to use "any" factor other than age as a defense by disregarding
the word "reasonable" in the statutory language. Furthermore, the
judicial decisions, scholarship, and interpretation of the administering
agency, all of which were more contemporaneous with the passage of the
ADEA, support the conclusion that the use of an age-correlated factor
must be justified by the employer.8 Thus, under the second component
of the proposed solution, RFOA is the defense the employer should have
to interpose, under either the disparate treatment theory or the disparate
impact theory, if he uses an age-correlated criterion that screens out
older workers.
22. See infra note 69 (citing cases in which courts found the employer's use of factors that
correlate with age violative of the ADEA).
23. See supra note 15.
24. 507 U.S. at 612.
25. Id. at 61o. The Court never reached the disparate impact theory because the employee
"claim[ed] only that he received disparate treatment." Id.
26. See infra Section V.
27. See cases cited infra Section V.
28. See infra Section V.A.2.
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Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly mention the defense
of RFOA in Hazen Paper, the Court said that, in a disparate treatment
case, the ADEA is not violated if the employer legitimately acts on the
basis of any factor other than age, even if it strongly correlates with age.29
The lower courts are problematically over-reading Hazen Paper to hold
that the employer's use of any factor other than age, even if age-
correlated, has no more evidentiary significance than any non-age-
related factor" and can even serve as a defense.3'
This view of Hazen Paper reads the defense of RFOA out of the
statute and replaces it in all cases with the defense of "legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason." Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is not a
statutory defense to an ADEA suit, but rather it was borrowed from
Title VII which contains no defense comparable to RFOA.32 Legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason can be any reason that does not discriminate
on its face;33 it does not have to be reasonable.' In ADEA terms, it can
be any factor other than age.
Although lower courts are interpreting Hazen Paper very broadly,35
much of the language from Hazen Paper that the lower courts are citing
is taken out of context or is dicta, from which the Court should retreat?
Because the statutory structure and contemporaneous understanding of
the ADEA do not permit RFOA to be interpreted as "any factor other
than age," it is unlikely that the Supreme Court in Hazen Paper would
have made such an important determination without a statutory
reference to, and analysis of, the RFOA defense. Furthermore, if RFOA
means "any" factor other than age, then disparate impact may not apply
to the ADEA,37 a decision that the Hazen Paper Court said it was not
making, and would surely not make in such an offhand manner. Even
though RFOA has not been adequately defined under the ADEA,38 it
29. 507U.S. at6il-I2.
30. See cases cited infra Section V.
31. See, e.g., Domb v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. oI Civ. 1o074, 2003 WL 21878784, *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2003) ("[T]o the extent that Domb's dismissal was motivated by financial considerations, that
disproves, rather than proves age discrimination: '[An employer's concern about the economic
consequences of employment decisions does not constitute age discrimination under the ADEA, even
though there may be a correlation with age."' (quoting Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., i19 F.3 d 102,
105 (2d Cir. 1997))).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 156-67.
33- Id.
34. See infra Section V.
35. See infra Section V.C.
36. Although my first article assumed that there was little room after Hazen Paper to interpret
RFOA as anything other than "any factor other than age," I now am making a different argument in
this sequel, nine years later.
37. If RFOA means "any" factor other than age, this would probably preclude disparate impact
because the basis for a disparate impact case is that a factor other than age is causing the disparate
impact. See discussion infra accompanying notes 72-75.
38. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act's Forgotten Affirmative
Defense: The Reasonable Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. REV. 155, 18o-8i (1986).
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must be afforded a place in the statutory scheme and cannot be
considered surplusage. The argument I am making is that if the employer
uses an age-correlated factor, the employer has to justify the factor using
the RFOA defense, whether the plaintiff uses the disparate treatment
theory or the disparate impact theory.3 9
In many cases involving age-correlated factors, the employer may be
intentionally ridding the workforce of older workers, which the employer
cannot accomplish directly but nevertheless may do so indirectly by
covertly using age-correlated factors. In other cases, the employer may
not be consciously intending to discriminate. Rather, the employer may
choose the age-correlated criterion because employees who are earning a
higher salary, for example, are not perceived as "worth it," based on
stereotypical but unconscious views regarding older workers.
Stereotypical views depict older workers as potentially less
employable than younger persons, particularly for managerial positions.
Research findings suggest that older persons are seen as less capable of
responding creatively, enthusiastically, or efficiently to job demands.
Moreover, age stereotypes depict older employees as less interested in
change and less capable of coping with future challenges. To the extent
these stereotypes (which are not borne out by the research as being
empirically correct) influence managerial decisions, there are potentially
serious consequences for older employees, including lowered motivation,
career stagnation, and eventual career obsolescence.'
Until shortly after Hazen Paper was decided, most lower courts
allowed plaintiffs to ferret out unconscious and other hidden
discrimination using the disparate impact model of proof. The majority
of courts now hold that the disparate impact theory does not apply to the
ADEA, based in large part on Hazen Paper.4
In 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the
disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA4 but later dismissed the
petition as improvidently granted.43 It appeared that the Court would
never have to decide the issue because disparate impact, as applied to the
ADEA, is dying of its own accord in the lower courts." Nevertheless, as
discussed earlier, the Court has recently granted certiorari to decide the
issue.45
39. See infra text accompanying notes 63-66 for a discussion of disparate impact and Section
V.2.a. discussing the defense of RFOA.
40. Eglit, supra note 3, at 672 (quoting BENSON ROSEN & THOMAS H. JERDEE, OLDER EMPLOYEES:
NEw ROLES FOR VALUED RESOURCES 35-36 (1985)).
41. See discussion infra accompanying note 95.
42. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 534 U.S. 1054 (2001) (cert. granted).
43. Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 (2002) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted).
44. See discussion infra accompanying notes 1oi-o2.
45. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S.
Mar. 29, 2004) (No. 03-S s6o).
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While the disparate impact theory and properly applying the RFOA
defense do not provide the ideal protection for ADEA claimants, 6 their
availability may deter employers from using age-correlated factors.
Without the disparate impact theory and RFOA, employers may use
unjustified age-correlated factors with virtual impunity to rid their
workforces of older employees. For example, an employer could
eliminate all high-salaried employees or all employees with more than
ten years of service. Without the disparate impact theory and without
requiring the employer to justify the use of age-correlated factors under
the disparate treatment theory, the use of any age-correlated factor will
be a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.47 The burden will then be
imposed on the employee to show that the age-correlated factor is a
pretext for age discrimination -a difficult task. 8
The now too-common corporate practice of downsizing presents a
graphic illustration of the problem of allowing employers to use
unjustified age-correlated criteria. Since Hazen Paper, courts are
rejecting the idea that higher wages can be a proxy for age, which
encourages employers to target older late-career employees for lay-off.49
One author suggests that "[b]y downsizing aging late-career workers for
cost containment reasons, however, the corporation is in reality favoring
younger workers over older workers. Age thus becomes a factor, albeit
an unstated one, in the decision to downsize, even though the express
reason given is cost savings."'
Whether the employer is intentionally trying to rid the workforce of
older workers because of their age or whether the employer may be
accomplishing the same thing by getting rid of higher-salaried employees,
the ADEA must provide some protection. Furthermore, not only do
employers use age-correlated factors other than higher salary to
eliminate older workers, but other reasons such as age stereotyping and
subconscious discrimination may also be coming into play. Nevertheless,
regardless of the specific age-correlated factor used or the stated reason
for using it, the most likely motive of employers who use age-correlated
factors is to rid the workforce of older workers who are perceived as not
worth their salaries. While cutting costs by eliminating higher-salaried
workers should not be illegal, the ADEA should be interpreted to
require the employer to justify imposing the cost-savings on older
workers.
46. See Michael C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: Will the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 507, 530 n.I27 (noting only two successful
cases as of the date of the author's research).
47. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,612 (1993).
48. See Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The High Court
Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimination Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 385, 403-05
(994).
49. Minda, supra note I, at 536.
50. Id. at 532.
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The implication that was obvious to the courts in earlier ADEA
cases was that employers are making assumptions about the value of
older employees and should have to justify any decision that impacts
older workers, whether in an intentional or merely a predictable manner.
The question is not whether the ADEA was intended to prevent such
behavior on the part of employers -or whether it would have been if the
current employment climate had been contemplated. It clearly was
intended for such a purpose: the ADEA was designed to prevent
discrimination based on negative stereotypical thinking regarding older
workers.5
Instead, given the present interpretation of the law, the question is
how to rehabilitate the ADEA so that it will fulfill its purpose of
protecting older workers. This protection is especially crucial today when
older workers are bearing the brunt of current business forces that
encourage employers to disregard values other than economically
advantageous simple solutions, such as laying off higher-salaried
workers. 2
The ADEA was particularly designed to eliminate the ability of the
employer to act based on stereotypical views of older workers. 3 Without
the application of the disparate impact theory and the proper use of
RFOA, employers can act based on age-correlated factors that can be
used to disguise age stereotyping. Because a legislative solution is
unlikely, the only judicial solution is to interpret the ADEA's RFOA
51. See Eglit, supra note 3, at 582-83. The Supreme Court seems to agree with this view of the
ADEA, having recently commented on the history of the Act, as follows:
Congress chose not to include age within discrimination forbidden by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... Instead it called for a study of the issue by the Secretary
of Labor, who concluded that age discrimination was a serious problem, but one different
in kind from discrimination on account of race. The Secretary spoke of disadvantage to
older individuals from arbitrary and stereotypical employment distinctions (including
then-common policies of age ceilings on hiring), but he examined the problem in light of
rational considerations of increased pension cost and, in some cases, legitimate concerns
about an older person's ability to do the job. When the Secretary ultimately took the
position that arbitrary discrimination against older workers was widespread and
persistent enough to call for a federal legislative remedy, he placed his recommendation
against the background of common experience that the potential cost of employing
someone rises with age, so that the older an employee is, the greater the inducement to
prefer a younger substitute....
... The record thus reflects the common facts that an individual's chances to find
and keep a job get worse over time; as between any two people, the younger is in the
stronger position, the older more apt to be tagged with demeaning stereotype.
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236 1240-42 (2004) (holding permissible
discrimination against younger people in the protected age group in favor of older people in the
protected age group) (citations and footnote omitted).
52. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 238-40 (discussing occasions when it may be economically
rational to engage in prohibited classification of employees by protected class, which are nevertheless
prohibited by law).
53. Id. at 287-95.
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defense to require an employer to justify the use of age-correlated
factors under either theory of discrimination, disparate treatment or
disparate impact.
This article will describe the ADEA generally in Section II. Section
III will discuss how the ADEA was interpreted before Hazen Paper and
will discuss the Hazen Paper case in Section IV. Section V will explore
the lower court opinions interpreting the ADEA since Hazen Paper and
why these courts hold that the disparate impact theory should not apply.
Section VI will sample recent lower court cases illustrating the effect on
recent ADEA decisions stemming from not applying the disparate
impact theory and RFOA. Section VII will analyze and suggest the
proper interpretation of RFOA and the application of the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA as the solution to preventing the unjustified
use of age-correlated factors.
II. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
The ADEA prohibits discrimination based on age against persons
over the age of forty.54 Because the wording of the prohibitions against
age discrimination in the ADEA was taken word for word from Title
VII,55 the ADEA provides the same basic protections based on age for
people over forty that Title VII provides against discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, color and national origin.56 As a result of this similarity
54. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2000). The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12. 8i Stat. 6o2, 6o7 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631), originally prohibited discrimination against persons ages forty to sixty-
five. The upper age limit was raised in 1978 to seventy in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 631), before being removed altogether in 1986 by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), ioo Stat. 3342, 3342 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 631).
55. Lorillard, A Div. of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978). Congress rejected
age as a basis for discrimination under Title VII but directed the Secretary of Labor to study the
problem of age discrimination. See i1o CONG. REC. 2596-99; 991 1-13; 13,490-92 (1964). For the actual
report, see U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIL RIGHTS AcT OF
1964 (1965), and U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 RESEARCH MATERIALS (1965). For a discussion of the report, see Kaminshine,
supra note 13, at 287-3o6, and ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, INTERPRETING THE ADEA: INTENT OR IMPACT,
reprinted in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTmONERS 68 (M. Lake ed., 1982). Professors Kaminshine and
Blumrosen have dissected the Secretary's report for evidence of whether the ADEA was intended to
prohibit practices that have a disparate impact, coming to contrary conclusions. See BLUMROSEN, supra,
at 73; Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 290-97.
56. Compare Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 6o2
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), with Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§2oooe-2(a) (200o). The ADEA provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(i) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
[Vol. 55:1399
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between the two Acts, the courts have generally interpreted the ADEA
consistently with Title VII.
17
The principal differences between the two Acts are in the remedial
provisions and some of the defenses. The remedial provisions of the
ADEA were drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act58 (FLSA) and
provide for liquidated damages for willful violations. 9 Although the
ADEA and Title VII6° share the defenses of bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) and seniority, other defenses such as actions taken
pursuant to "reasonable factors other than age" or a bona fide employee
benefit plan, and discipline or discharge for good cause are specific to the
ADEA. 1
The similarity in the prohibitory provisions of the two Acts leads to
the inescapable conclusion that, absent a strong indication in the
legislative intent to the contrary, the understanding of discrimination
developed under Title VII, which encompasses both the disparate impact
and disparate treatment theories of discrimination, must be applied to
the ADEA. Nevertheless, since Hazen Paper, a majority of lower courts
now hold that the disparate impact theory does not apply to the ADEA
and ignore or misuse the defense of RFOA in disparate treatment
actions. The only plausible argument for not applying the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA relies on a broad interpretation of the
RFOA defense, which is not found in Title VII. This argument, which
requires RFOA to mean "any" factor other than age, must be examined
and refuted.
of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age ....
29 U.S.C. § 623.
57. See Westerm Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985); Monce v. City of San Diego,
895 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 199o); MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 517 (1988);
Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 231; cf. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584. The courts generally apply the
disparate treatment theory as articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
to the ADEA. See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
586 (3d ed. 1996). Because the Civil Rights Act of 1995 did not include the ADEA in its changes to the
law governing disparate impact, mixed motive, and remedies, the application of Title VII law to the
ADEA has changed. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the
Civil Rights Act of 19i: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REv. 1093, 1215-16
(1993).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 216.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
6o. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(e), (h). The BFOQ defense under Title VII only applies to sex, religious
and national origin discrimination. Id. § 20ooe-2(e). Race discrimination cannot be defended as a
BFOQ. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5IO U.S. 17, 25-26 (i993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). There are
defenses under Title VII that are not contained in the ADEA as well, such as action taken pursuant to
a merit system or a system which measures quantity or quality of production or a professionally
developed test. Id. § 2oooe-2(h).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f). See infra note 142 for the full text of this section.
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III. How THE ADEA WAS INTERPRETED BEFORE HAZEN PAPER
As discussed above, because of the similarity between Title VII and
the ADEA, the courts generally applied both the disparate impact and
the disparate treatment theory of discrimination to the ADEA before
Hazen Paper." The Supreme Court developed the disparate impact
theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,6' holding that Title VII prohibits not
just intentional discrimination, but also discrimination that is "fair in
form but discriminatory in effect." '6 When the Court said that "[u]nder
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices,"
65
discriminatory impact became, not a different kind of discrimination, but
a part of the definition of what it means to discriminate in employment.
Because of the similarity between the two statutes, part of the
understanding of discrimination developed under Title VII was
necessarily incorporated into the ADEA. The ADEA must, therefore,
also be interpreted to prohibit the unjustified use of selection criteria
that are neutral on their face but which adversely impact the protected
class. 66
Although disparate impact is generally associated with unintentional
discrimination, it also ferrets out intentional discrimination that is
difficult to prove. 6' Before Hazen Paper, the majority of courts
recognized that disparate impact applied to the ADEA. 6' In fact,
disparate impact was not necessary at that time to prohibit the use of
many neutral criteria that had an adverse effect on older workers
because a majority of courts simply assumed that an employer using
62. See supra note 57 and infra text accompanying note 68.
63. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
64. Id. at 431.
65. Id. at 430.
66. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 234.
67. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (Proof of discriminatory intent does not cure the
problem of workplace discrimination, which is a by-product of societal discrimination, largely brought
about by unconscious discrimination.); David B. Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 899 (1993) (Professor Oppenheimer suggests that since most discrimination is unintentional, a
better theory of discrimination would be based on negligence, rather than intent.). This being the case,
the disparate impact theory would more effectively eradicate societal discrimination, including age
discrimination. See also Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Marvin Jones, The Death of the
Employer: Image, Text, and Title VII, 45 VAND. L. REV. 349 (1992); Don Welch, Removing
Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 6o S.
CAL. L. REV. 734, 759-62 (1987). See Johnson supra note 2, at 58 n.251 for further discussion of this
issue.
68. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 27-28. Most courts held that the use of age-correlated factors
was discriminatory per se. This probably accounts for why the disparate impact defense was not
actually applied to the ADEA very often and why it was rarely successful. See Sloan, supra note 46, at
538, in which the author notes only two successful cases as of the date of his research.
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criteria that correlated with age, such as overqualification, high salary,
tenure and seniority, was intentionally discriminating.69 Such courts went
so far as to hold that the use of such criteria was discriminatory per se."
Many of these decisions were made shortly after the ADEA was enacted,
contributing to the consensus regarding the intent and meaning of the
ADEA at that time.7 Several years after the enactment of the ADEA,
however, the consensus regarding age-correlated factors and the
applicability of the disparate impact theory to the ADEA began to
change.
In 198I, Justice Rehnquist made the first important contention that
the courts had erroneously applied the disparate impact theory to the
ADEA. In a dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist said
that the Court had never held that the disparate impact theory applied to
69. See, e.g., Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. I99i); Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912
F.2d 867, 875-76 (6th Cir. 199o); Jardien v.Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1 57-58 (7th Cir.
1989); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 1988); Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828
F.2d 1202, i2o6-o7 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled by, Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120,
1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994); Reichman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta P.C., 818 F. 2d 278, 28o-8I (2d
Cir. 1987); Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1983); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State
College, 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 198o). Contra
Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 131 n.131 (5th Cir. 1981); Laugeson v. Anaconda Co.,
510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
In Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691, for example, the defendant tried to justify its reduction in force
plan which had a disparate impact on older employees as a cost-saving measure required by business
necessity. The defendant had reserved certain positions for non-tenured faculty, because they were
paid less than tenured faculty. Id. The court said that "economic savings derived from discharging
older employees cannot serve as a legitimate justification under the ADEA." Id. Although the plan
was based on tenure status rather than age, the court recognized that because of the close relationship
between tenure status and age, the plain intent and effect of the defendants' practice was to eliminate
older workers who had built up, through years of case satisfactory service, higher salaries than their
younger counterparts. If the existence of such higher salaries can be used to justify discharging older
employees, the purpose of the ADEA will be defeated. Although this was a disparate impact case, the
court evidently believed that the policy was discriminatory per se, as did the court in Geller, which was
also a disparate impact case. 635 F.2d at 1027.
In the Geller case the employer refused to hire teachers with more than five years of
experience, a policy which impacted 92% of the teachers over forty. The court said that this policy was
discriminatory per se and could not be justified by business necessity. 635 F.2d at 1033-34.
In Reichman, the court was reviewing a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 818 F.2d at 278.
The court said that evidence that the defendant would have saved $6o,ooo in pension costs in firing the
plaintiff ten months before her pension vested was sufficient to support the verdict. The court assumed
without analyzing the point that desire to save pension costs would violate the ADEA. Id. at 28o-8i.
In Jardien, the court approved the instruction to the jury in the lower court that "salary
savings that can be realized by replacing a single employee aged sixty, with a younger, lower-salaried
employee does not constitute a permissible, nondiscriminatory justification." 888 F.2d at 1157. In this
case the defendant complained that the plaintiff was a new hire so that his salary did not reflect his
seniority. Nevertheless, the court said that his salary did reflect his greater experience in the workforce
which was the equivalent. Id. at 1157-58.
Similarly, the court in Laugeson, said that if "too many years on the job" meant length of
service, which is inevitably related to age, that would show discrimination. 5io F.2d at 313.




the ADEA and suggested that it should not.72 The support for this
contention was weak. Justice Rehnquist cited part of the general
prohibitory section of the ADEA, §4(a)(I), as support for the
proposition that the ADEA permits policies that have a disparate
impact.73 However, the dissent omitted any reference to §4(a)(2), the
other part of the prohibitory section, which was copied from a provision
in Title VII that has been interpreted to authorize the disparate impact
theory.74 Justice Rehnquist also cited the RFOA defense for the
proposition that the ADEA allows the employer to defend using any
factor other than age, ignoring the important word "reasonable" in the
RFOA defense.75 Justice Rehnquist's position gathered little support in
the lower courts76 until the Supreme Court's next reference to disparate
impact and the ADEA in Hazen Paper in 1993.
Thus, at the time Hazen Paper was decided, the majority of the
lower courts still held that age-correlated factors could be attacked under
the disparate impact theory, and the majority of courts viewed the use of
age-correlated criteria as discriminatory per se.77 After Hazen Paper, the
situation changed dramatically.
IV. HAZEN PAPER CO. v. BIGGINS
At the outset, the Court in Hazen Paper said that it had granted
certiorari to decide two questions, only the first of which is important to
72. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947 (i981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of petition
for certiorari). In that case the lower court had decided that a policy of refusing to hire teachers with
more than five years of experience had a disparate impact on teachers over forty. Justice Rehnquist
noted that "[tihis Court has never held that proof of discriminatory impact can establish a violation of
the ADEA." Id. at 948 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
73. Justice Rehnquist insisted that since the policy made no reference to age, it could not violate
the ADEA, citing two bases for this conclusion: i) the first part of the anti-discrimination provision
contained in the ADEA, § 4(a)(I), which provides that it is unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or to discriminate with regard to any term or condition of employment
because of age. Id. at 947 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I)) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and 2) the ADEA's
defense of "reasonable factors other than age." Id. at 949 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra Section
V for a discussion of this argument.
74. See discussion infra accompanying notes 117-19.
75. Markham, 451 U.S. at 949. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 55, for a further discussion.
76. "There has been a modicum of judicial resistance to the infusion of disparate impact analysis
into the ADEA context." Eglit, supra note 57, at lO99 n.18.
77. See, e.g., Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d io6, 115 (2d Cir. 1992); MacPherson v. Univ.
of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 770-71 (itth Cir. i991); Abbott v. Fed. Forge, Inc., 912 F.2d 867, 872-73
(6th Cir. 199o); Holt v. Gamewell Corp., 797 F.2d 36, 37 (ist Cir. 1986); Shutt v. Sandoz Crop
Protection Corp., 934 F.2d 186, 189 (9 th Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d
686, 69o-9I (8th Cir. 1983) (all holding that the disparate impact theory applied to the ADEA). See
generally Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, 3 F.3 d 1419, 1428 (ioth Cir. 1993); Fisher v. Transco Servs.-
Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.3 (7th Cir. 1992); Arnold v. U.S. Postal Serv., 863 F.2d 994,998
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Akins v. S. Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984); Massarsky
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 706 F.2d I I I, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (all assuming without deciding that the theory
applied to the ADEA). The idea that disparate impact should apply to the ADEA was attacked in a
frequently cited dissent by Judge Easterbrook. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting).
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this article: "Does an employer's interference with the vesting of pension
benefits violate the ADEA? '7 8 The plaintiff in Hazen Paper had been
discharged shortly before his pension was to vest.79 The jury found that
the employer discharged the plaintiff because of his age in violation of
the ADEA and to keep his pension from vesting in violation of ERISA. °
The Court addressed the question of whether the lower courts were
correct in holding that an employer's decision based on pension vesting,
a factor that correlated with age, was discriminatory per se under the
ADEA. The Court said that "there is no disparate treatment under the
ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other
than the employee's age."'s. In this case, although pension vesting or
"years of service" correlated with age, the Court found that it was not
perfectly correlated with age." The pension vesting period was ten years,
allowing people under forty to be close to vesting. 83
The Court, expressly prefacing Hazen Paper with a statement that it
was a disparate treatment case, not a disparate impact case, said:
Disparate treatment.., captures the essence of what Congress sought
to prohibit in the ADEA. It is the very essence of age discrimination
for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes that
productivity and competence decline with old age. [citations omitted]
Congress' promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern
that older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes....
When the employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other
than age, the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes
disappears. This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with
age, as pension status typically is.
84
The Supreme Court equated a "factor other than age" with a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the judicially-created defense to
Title VII actions also applied to the ADEA, and "clarified" that defense
as well.s  The Court noted that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason or a
"factor other than age" can be any reason, regardless of how improper or
78. 507 U.S. 604, 608 (1993). The second question related to the issue of what constitutes a willful
violation for purposes of liquidated damages. id.
79. Id. at 606.
80. Id.
8i. Id. at 609 (emphasis added). This was correct because the employer should be given the
opportunity to justify an age-correlated criterion as an RFOA. See discussion infra accompanying
notes 193-94.
82. Id. at 612. The Court did not review, but simply noted that the lower court had properly
affirmed the jury's verdict regarding the ERISA violation. Id.
83. Id. at6i.
84. Id. at 61o-ii.
85. The Court said that "[a]lthough some language in our prior decisions might be read to mean
that an employer violates the ADEA whenever its reason for firing an employee is improper in any
respect.... this reading is obviously incorrect." Id. at 612 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (a Title VII disparate treatment case)). See infra text accompanying notes
158-67 for a discussion of legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
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illegal, as long as it does not violate the particular act under which the
plaintiff is suing. "For example, it cannot be true that an employer who
fires an older black worker because the worker is black thereby violates
the ADEA. The employee's race is an improper reason, but it is
improper under Title VII, not the ADEA."'
In the Hazen Paper case, therefore, the Court decided that an
employer does not engage in intentional discrimination under the
ADEA if the employment decision is based on any factor "other than
age," even if the factor correlates with age, as long as the factor does not
correlate perfectly with age or is not a pretext for discrimination."7 The
question presented was whether the lower court was correct in holding
that pension vesting was discriminatory per se.m That is all the Court was
deciding. The Court did not determine the proof necessary to show that
the employer actually acted on a factor other than age. Most importantly
for the zurposes of this article, the Court did not mention the RFOA
defense.
The holding in Hazen Paper was simply that the use of an age-
correlated factor is not discriminatory per se.' As another author has
noted, the Supreme Court
did not foreclose the use of the proxy theory [that age-correlated
factors can be a proxy for age discrimination] in all cases. The Court
stated that factors like pension status 'may be a proxy for age, not in
the sense that the ADEA makes the two factors equivalent.., but in
the sense that the employer may suppose a correlation between the
two factors and act accordingly.' 9'
Nevertheless, the courts continue to ignore the defense of RFOA and
not only hold that basing an employment decision on an unjustified age-
correlated factor is not discriminatory, but that use of an age-correlated
factor is not considered evidence of discrimination.92
86. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 612.
87. Id. at 61I.
88. Id. at 6o8.
89. In fact, the courts have generally failed to analyze RFOA. See Eglit, supra note 38, at 169-7o.
The principal cases analyzing RFOA involved explicit use of age as a factor and should have been
analyzed under the affirmative defense of bona fide occupational qualification, see EEOC v. Chrysler
Corp., 733 F.2d 1183, 1185 (6th Cir. 1984), or used a factor that correlated perfectly with age, pension
eligibility. See EEOC v. Local 350, Plumbers and Pipefitters, 982 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1993);
EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 869 F.2d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. granted and jmt. vacated,
493 U.S. 8ot (1989); EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4, 5 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204
(1984).
9o.Although in my first article I was inclined to believe that Hazen Paper effectively precluded
an interpretation of the defense of RFOA different from "any" factor other than age, I am now taking
a more optimistic view, held by other scholars. Neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts have
yet to define the scope of RFOA. See Robert J. Gregory, There is Life in that Old (I Mean, More
"Senior") Dog Yet: The Age-Proxy Theory after Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, ix HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 391,
392 (1994); Sloan, supra note 46.
91. Gregory, supra note 90, at 392 (citing Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 613).
92. See infra Section VI.
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To compound this overreading of Hazen Paper, courts are also citing
the case for the proposition that disparate impact does not apply to the
ADEA.93 The Court in Hazen Paper said that "we have never decided
whether the disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA, and we need not do so here. Respondent claims only that he
received disparate treatment."94 Despite these statements regarding what
the case was about-and, more importantly, what it was not about-
lower courts have used Hazen Paper as authority that disparate impact
should not apply to the ADEA.'
Three members of the Court joined in a concurrence, authored by
Justice Kennedy, stating that there are "substantial arguments that it is
improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the
ADEA."'  The "substantial arguments" cited by the concurrence were
comprised of Justice Rehnquist's 1981 dissent from the denial of a
petition for certiorari discussed above,' a student casenote 98 and a lower
court dissent.' Even the concurrence, however, did not expressly
conclude that disparate impact does not apply to the ADEA.
The lower courts are patently wrong in citing Hazen Paper for the
proposition that disparate impact does not apply to the ADEA.' ° The
Court in Hazen Paper said only that in a disparate treatment case if the
employer interposes a factor other than age that is not a pretext for
discrimination, he is not guilty of intentional discrimination. Thus, the
possibility remains that if the employer uses a factor other than age that
93. See infra Section V.C.
94. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 61o (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
95. See infra Section V.C.
96. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
97. Markham v. Geller, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. I98o), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see discussion supra accompanying notes 69-72.
98. Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 837 (1982). This casenote was written in 1982 and is largely outdated, given subsequent changes
in the law. The note asserts that the disparate impact theory is not appropriate under the ADEA. One
of the reasons the author cites is that Title VII cases should only be authoritative for the ADEA when
such cases involve a statutory provision having a counterpart in the ADEA. At that time, the statutory
basis for disparate impact in Title VII had been identified, although, perhaps, only in passing. Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976). See infra note iii for additional discussion. Shortly after
the note was written, however, the Supreme Court clearly found statutory support for the disparate
impact theory in § 703(a)(2). The note was published in April 1982, before Connecticut v. Teal, which
explicitly identified the statutory basis for disparate impact, and was decided in June 1982. 457 U.S.
440, 445-46 (1982).
99. The dissent in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting), overruled by, Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994),
which Justice Kennedy's concurrence cited, was a disparate treatment case. The majority decided that
the employer had discriminated in using a factor that correlated with age. The dissent thought that the
majority had reached its conclusion by confusing the disparate impact and disparate treatment
theories and questioned whether the employer discriminated even applying the disparate impact
theory. Id. at 1216-2o. In the explication of its opinion, the dissent questioned in passing whether
disparate impact applied at all to ADEA cases. Id. at 1220.
too. See infra Section V.B.
June 2004]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
strongly correlates with age, such employer must bear more of a burden
under the RFOA defense in order to show that the factor is not
disguising intentional discrimination. Furthermore, because the Court
stated that the decision did not involve disparate impact, Hazen Paper
does not preclude a requirement that the employer justify an age-
correlated factor as an RFOA under the disparate impact analysis. In
fact, if the RFOA defense has no place in a disparate treatment case
after Hazen Paper, then the statutory language has no meaning at all
unless it is a defense to a disparate impact case.
V. LOWER COURT OPINIONS SINCE HAZEN PAPER DISCUSSING HOW THE
ADEA SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AND WHY DISPARATE IMPACT DOES
NOT APPLY
At this point, little more than ten years after Hazen Paper, only a
minority of circuit courts hold that the disparate impact theory applies to
the ADEA."' The other circuits hold that disparate impact does not
apply or that there are serious questions in this regard.' 2 These circuits
base their decisions on arguments made before Hazen Paper and
ioi. With regard to whether the disparate impact theory applies to the ADEA, the courts hold as
follows: The First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh say unequivocably that the theory does not
apply. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 191 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3614
(Mar. 29, 2004); Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (iith Cir. 2ooi), cert. granted, 534
U.S. 1054 (2ooi), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 535 U.S. 228 (2002); Mullin v. Raytheon
Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700-o (ist Cir. I999); Ellis v. United Airlines, 73 F.3d 999, Ioo6-o7 (ioth Cir.
1996). In the Seventh Circuit, EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994), the
court set out the arguments against disparate impact, but failed to expressly preclude it. Id. at IO78
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). The Seventh Circuit now holds without analysis that disparate impact does
not apply to the ADEA. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340,342 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Third and Sixth Circuits have not said that disparate impact does not apply, but express
such serious misgivings that it is unlikely that the theory will be applied in these circuits. See DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732-735 (3 d Cir. 1995) (detailing the arguments against
disparate impact and concluding that it was unnecessary to say that it would never apply but that it did
not apply in the instant case). See also Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3 d 1042, 1048 (6th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), where the court stated:
Although we stated in Abbot v. Federal Forge Inc., that a disparate-impact theory of age
discrimination may be possible, we have subsequently noted that in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, there is now 'considerable doubt as to
whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory.'
The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits continue to allow disparate impact claims. See Frank v. United
Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000); Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., iI9 F.3 d 102, 105 (2d
Cir. 1997); Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997). However, the
Eighth Circuit has indicated some doubt whether disparate impact applies. Allen v. Entergy, 193 F.3d
1010, 1015 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Hazen Paper for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
"suggested that the ADEA does not permit such actions").
The Fourth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have not addressed this issue. See Adams, 255 F.3d at
1325 n.5. In a case on an unrelated issue, however, the D.C. Circuit has interpreted Hazen Paper to
cast doubt on the applicability of the disparate impact theory to the ADEA. Contractors' Labor Pool,
Inc. v. NLRB, 323 F.3d IO5i, io6o (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting in a National Labor Relations Act case,
"the Court has been reluctant to extend the disparate impact theory to other laws prohibiting
discrimination even where the statutory language bears greater resemblance").
102. Contractors' Labor Pool, 323 F.3d at io6o.
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referenced in Justice Kennedy's concurrence as substantial reasons for
why disparate impact does not apply to the ADEA.'" Courts also rely on
rationales used before, but not referenced in Hazen Paper, and some
courts are contriving rationales not used before Hazen Paper.
The following rationales for not applying the disparate impact
theory to the ADEA were used, but not accepted, before Hazen Paper:
i) The text of the ADEA only prohibits intentional discrimination
because of age;"' 2) the defense of RFOA precludes disparate impact,"5
a rationale that analogizes RFOA to a defense under the Equal Pay
Act6'0 that may preclude disparate impact under that statute;' and 3) the
legislative history of the ADEA precludes disparate impact.
The following rationales for not applying the disparate impact
theory to the ADEA are derived from Hazen Paper: I) Even though the
Court in Hazen Paper said that disparate impact was not an issue, the
Court did say that it is an open question;"° 2) the Court in Hazen Paper
said that basing an employment decision on a factor other than age is
acceptable under the ADEA, which necessarily precludes a disparate
impact analysis;"0 and 3) Hazen Paper said that disparate treatment
captures the essence of the ADEA, thus precluding disparate impact."'
The following rationales are in addition to arguments made before,
or alluded to in, Hazen Paper: I) Congress amended Title VII in i99I to
codify the disparate impact theory and did not similarly amend the
ADEA; ' 2 and 2) Title VII was designed to eliminate the effects of past
discriminatory experiences, while age discrimination correlates with
103. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
lO4. See Ellis, 73 F.3d loO7; DiBiase, 48 F.3 d at 734; Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1076.
105. See Smith, 351 F.3d at 189-93; Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 701-o2; Ellis, 73
F.3d xoo7; DiBiase, 48 F.3 d at 734; Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d at 1077.
io6. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3,77 Stat. 56, 57 (1963)-
io7. The Equal Pay Act ("EPA") has a defense similar to RFOA, "any other factor other than
sex," which the Supreme Court has said may preclude disparate impact under the EPA. See County of
Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (I981). See infra Section V.A.2.a. for a discussion of this
issue.
iO8. See, e.g., Smith, 351 F.3d at 194; Adams, 255 F.3d at 1325; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702-03; Ellis, 73
F.3d at Ioo7.
io9 . See Adams, 255 F.3 d at 1326. Cf. Ellis, 73 F.3d at ioo8 (going even further to say that the
Court in Hazen Paper said in dicta that the ADEA only prohibits disparate treatment).
i io. See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326; Ellis, 73 F.3d at too8; DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 732.
ti. See Adams, 255 F.3d at 1326; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 7oo-ot; Ellis, 73 F.3d at ioo8; Dibiase, 48
F.2d at 732; Francis W. Parker School, 4 F.3d at 1o76.
112. See Mullin, 164 F.3 d at 703; Ellis, 73 F.3d at ioo8. But see Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3 d
183, i86 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3614 (Mar. 29, 2004). In Smith, the Fifth Circuit
decided that disparate impact does not apply to the ADEA, but declined to base the decision on the
I991 Act. Id.
[Clongressional inaction is susceptible of multiple interpretations, however, and so we
should hesitate before we draw inferences from it. The Civil Rights Act of i99i was mainly
aimed at overriding certain interpretations of Title VII, and so we do not find it especially
probative with respect to the question before us today.
Id. at 186 n. i (citations omitted).
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contemporaneous and not past discriminatory practices.11 3
These reasons, alone or in concert, are not sufficiently persuasive to
justify the damage their acceptance is doing to the statutory scheme of
the ADEA. Some of the rationales are disingenuous. The most obvious
of these is the rationale suggesting that the text of the ADEA applies
only to intentional discrimination.
A. STATUTE-BASED RATIONALES FOR NOT APPLYING THE DISPARATE
IMPACT THEORY TO THE ADEA
I. Section 4 (a) only forbids intentional discrimination
The rationale that the text of the ADEA applies only to intentional
discrimination relies on § 4(a)(I), which provides that it is unlawful "to
fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age."'.. 4 The section was taken word for word from its
counterpart in Title VII, § 703(a)(i)."'
Congress, however, prohibited more than these specific forms of
intentional discrimination in both Title VII and the ADEA. In particular,
Congress added § 4(a)(2) to the ADEA, copied from Title VII's
§ 7o3(a)!2), which serves as the statutory basis for the disparate impact
theory." Section 4(a)(2) provides that it is also an illegal practice for an
employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's age."",17 To the extent that the Supreme
Court has developed the disparate impact theory based on § 4(a)(2)'s
Title VII counterpart, the argument is simply foreclosed that the
ADEA's § 4(a)(2) can be interpreted differently from the statute from
which it was taken."8 The only superficially appealing argument that
113. See, e.g., Smith, 351 F.3d at 195; Mullin, 164 F.3d at 701.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(I) (2000).
115. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 8 n.27 for a direct comparison of the two statutes.
116. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 (1976); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136,
141 (977). In a later development, the Supreme Court, albeit in a bit of revisionist history, clearly
revealed in Teal, 457 U.S. at 445-46, that § 703(a)(2), quoted above, had been the basis for the Court's
articulation of the disparate impact theory in Griggs. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (I97).
In fact the Court had not indicated in Griggs that it was interpreting any particular part of Title VII,
but only that the "Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
I 17. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). See supra note 53 for full text of statute.
i 8. See, e.g., Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 230. The only major difference in the two provisions is
that Title VII specifically applies to applicants in § 7o3(a)(2), and the ADEA does not have the word
applicant in the statute. Congress amended Title VII after the ADEA was enacted to clarify that it did
apply to applicants, as the courts had always held. The ADEA has always been held to apply to
applicants. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 8 n.27. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 48-53, for a more
complete discussion of legislative history and statutory interpretation of the ADEA.
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§ 4(a)(2) of the ADEA should be interpreted differently from its
counterpart in Title VII is the fact that the ADEA has the RFOA
defense, not contained in Title VII.
2. The defense of RFOA precludes disparate impact
Some courts opine that because the ADEA allows employers to
defend based on "reasonable factors other than age," disparate impact is
precluded."9 As discussed above, the prohibitory provisions of the
ADEA were copied from Title VII; however, Congress added some
defenses to the ADEA that are not found in Title VII. The most
important defense for the purpose of this article, the RFOA defense, is
found in § 4(f)() which provides, "[i]t shall not be unlawful for an
employer, employment agency, or labor organization- (i) to take any
action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c) or (e) of this
section ... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age ..... The meaning of this defense is pivotal to the issue of
whether the ADEA will survive as an effective deterrent to
discrimination against older workers.
a. RFOA and the Equal Pay Act
There is scant legislative history on RFOA,'2' but there is little doubt
about the origin of the defense.'22 Although the prohibitory portion of
the ADEA was patterned after Title VII, the remedial provisions of the
ADEA were derived from the Fair Labor Standards Act.'23 Congress
modeled the RFOA defense'" on a part of the Fair Labor Standards
Act'25 known as the Equal Pay Act (EPA).2 6 Specifically, the RFOA
defense is based on the EPA's similar defense of "any other factor other
than sex."'27
The EPA prohibits employers from paying a salary differential for
equal work where such differential is based on sex. I Once the employee
shows that an employee of the opposite sex is performing equal work and
that the employer pays more to one than the other, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer to prove one of four defenses.' 9 One of
the defenses to the EPA is paying a salary differential based on "any
other factor other than sex" (hereinafter FOTS)."'
ii9. See infra Section V.A.2.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
121. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 193-94.
122. Id. at 194.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 201.
124. Eglit, supra note 38, at 195.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 201.
126. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 57 (1963).
127. Id.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 206. See Eglit, supra note 38, at 194, for an explanation of the Equal Pay Act.
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Congress was referencing FOTS when it added RFOA to the
ADEA. I3' As opposed to the EPA, the ADEA affirmatively added the
word "reasonable" to "factors other than age." Looking at the statutory
language alone, Congress meant to require the employer to justify the
use of a factor other than age because it added the term "reasonable" to
the same defense under the ADEA 32 The interpretations of the agencies
that have administered the ADEA, the Labor Department'33 and the
EEOC,'34 also support this interpretation.
The Supreme Court has said in dicta in County of Washington v.
Gunther that FOTS may preclude application of the disparate impact
theory under the EPA,'35 and some courts cite Gunther for the same
proposition under the ADEA' 3 6 Nevertheless, even under the much less
131. Eglit, supra note 38, at 195.
132. The legislative history of the RFOA is sparse and inconclusive. See Eglit, supra note 38, at
i8o-8i.
133. Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 302-03; Eglit, supra note 38, at 195 (citing 29 C.F.R.
§ 86o.Io3(e) (1985) (rescinded)). The current EEOC position is as follows:
Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age.
(a) Section 4(f)(I) of the Act provides that [...] it shall not be unlawful for an employer,
employment agency, or labor organization [...] to take any action otherwise prohibited
under paragraphs (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section [...] where the differentiation is based
on reasonable factors other than age [ .... I
(b) No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the scope of the phrase
"differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age." Whether such differentiations
exist must be decided on the basis of all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
each individual situation.
(c) When an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the defense that the
practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is unavailable.
(d) When an employment practice, including a test, is claimed as a basis for different
treatment of employees or applicants for employment on the grounds that it is a "factor
other than" age, and such a practice has an adverse impact on individuals within the
protected age group, it can only be justified as a business necessity. Tests which are asserted
as "reasonable factors other than age" will be scrutinized in accordance with the standards
set forth at Part 16O7 of this title.
(e) When the exception of "a reasonable factor other than age" is raised against an
individual claim of discriminatory treatment, the employer bears the burden of showing that
the "reasonable factor other than age" exists factually.
(f) A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees as a group is
unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which qualify for the section 4(0(2)
exception to the Act.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (20o3).
134. Eglit, supra note 38, at 195-96 (citing 29 C.F.R. § I625.7(d)).
135. 452 U.S. 161, 170-71 (198i).
136. See, e.g., Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994).
In a frequently cited dissent, Judge Easterbrook suggested that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Gunther, 452 U.S. at i70-71 (that the "other factors other than sex" defense precludes disparate
impact wage cases under the Equal Pay Act) should also apply to the ADEA. Metz, 828 F.2d at 1220.
In Gunther, the Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the Bennett Amendment to Title
VII which provided that the employer could differentiate on the basis of sex in compensation if
authorized to do so by the Equal Pay Act. 452 U.S. at 170-71. The Supreme Court decided that the
Bennett Amendment incorporated the four affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII. Id. The
Court recognized that the Equal Pay Act applies only to equal pay for equal work, while Title VII
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equivocal language of "any other factor other than sex," most lower
courts interpret the EPA's FOTS defense to require some business
justification if the factor has historically had an adverse impact on
women.'37 According to this interpretation, a factor that correlates with
sex may require additional justification, therefore revealing that "any"
factor other than sex may not be a sufficient defense under the EPA.'3
Thus, the fact that the RFOA defense is derived from the FOTS defense,
which is interpreted to require an employer justification, strengthens the
case that Congress meant to require at least as much employer
justification in adding the word "reasonable" to the ADEA.
Furthermore, FOTS is an affirmative defense.'39 The question of
whether RFOA under the ADEA should be an affirmative defense, with
regard to which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion, should be
decided with reference to its prototype, the EPA. As Professor Eglit
observed, the Supreme Court has said in the context of interpreting other
provisions of the ADEA drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the EPA:
Given the settled readings of both the FLSA generally, and of the EPA
specifically, the observations of the Court in Lorillard v. Pons, an
ADEA case, are particularly relevant.... [I]n devising the proper
interpretation of the statute, the Lorillard Court noted the
presumption that when "Congress adopts a new law incorporating
sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have
applies to other types of discriminatory compensation claims, and did not limit Title VII sex-based
wage claims to claims involving equal work. Id. The Court in Gunther left the question open as to how
sex-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII should be structured. Id. The comment that
FOTS may preclude a disparate impact case is clearly dicta. Id.
Other than this comment, the Supreme Court has not addressed disparate impact wage
claims. Most lower courts, however, require "other factors other than sex" to be justified as relating to
the employer concerns, see PLAYER, supra note 57, at 419, which is not that different from the
definition of business necessity in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (8989),
superseded in part by statute. See discussion infra accompanying note 173. Therefore, FOTS would not
preclude disparate impact compensation claims under Title VII in any event. See PLAYER, supra note
57, at 418.
137. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982).
138. See PLAYER, supra note 57, at 419. An illustration of how courts have interpreted FOTS is in
the treatment of whether the use of previous salary to determine present salary is a FOTS because past
salary tends to perpetuate historical discrimination against women. In Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876, the
court concluded that the employer cannot use such a factor "which causes a wage differential between
male and female employees absent an acceptable business reason." In Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710,
719 (8th Cir. 2003), the court rejected the "reasonableness" requirement, but said that the record must
be carefully reviewed "for evidence that contradicts an employer's claim of gender-neutrality."
In Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 84! F.2d 1567, 1570-71 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh Circuit
went even further and said that relying on past salary was per se not a FOTS, except in limited
circumstances. The court relied on Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1988), in which
the Court rejected the market force theory that allowed women to be paid less because this was the
evil the Act was designed to eliminate. Id. If even a factor that correlates with sex must be justified in
some way to be "any other factor other than sex," it is even more evident that "reasonable factors
other than age" must be justified.
139. See PLAYER, supra note 57, at 419.
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had knowledge of the interpretations given to the incorporated law, at
least insofar as it affects the new statute." The Court reasoned that this
presumption was particularly appropriate regarding consideration of
the ADEA, since in enacting the age statute, Congress "exhibited both
a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial
interpretations and a willingness to depart from those provisions
regarded as undesirable or inappropriate for incorporation. ' '
The Supreme Court's direction on interpreting the ADEA's remedial
provisions derived from the FLSA and the EPA applies equally well to
the ADEA's prohibitory provisions, which were derived from Title VII.
b. RFOA and Title VII
In contrast to Title VII, for which Congress provided no general
defenses,'4' Congress provided five defenses, including the RFOA
defense, to an ADEA action. '42 For Title VII, the Supreme Court
140. Eglit, supra note 38, at 195 (quoting Lorillard, A Div. of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 58Y (1978) (citations omitted)).
4I. As does the ADEA, Title VII provides a defense for a bona fide seniority system and a bona
fide occupational qualification. See 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(e), (h) (2000). The BFOQ defense is not
absolute under Title VII but only applies to sex, religious and national origin discrimination. See id.
§ 2oooe-2(e).
There are defenses under Title VII which are not contained in the ADEA as well, such as
action taken pursuant to a merit system or a system which measures quantity or quality of production
or a professionally developed test. See id. § 20ooe-2(h).
142. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (f) (2000). The Act states:
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization-
(i) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this
section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age, or where such practices involve an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would cause such
employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to violate the laws of the country
in which such workplace is located;
(2) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this
section -
(A) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system that is not intended to evade the
purposes of this chapter, except that no such seniority system shall require or permit the
involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 631(a) of this title because of
the age of such individual; or
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan-
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment made or cost
incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or incurred on behalf of a
younger worker, as permissible under section 1625.50, title 29, Code of Federal Regulations
(as in effect on June 22, 198 9 ); or
(ii) that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the relevant purpose
or purposes of this chapter.
Notwithstanding clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), no such employee benefit plan or
voluntary early retirement incentive plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and
no such employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any
individual specified by section 631 (a) of this title, because of the age of such individual. An
employer, employment agency, or labor organization acting under subparagraph (A), or
under clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (B), shall have the burden of proving that such
actions are lawful in any civil enforcement proceeding brought under this chapter; or
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
[Vol. 55:1399
REHABILITATE THE ADEA
developed business necessity'43  and legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason' 44 as the general defenses. Therefore, because Title VII and the
ADEA have been interpreted in pari materia,45 the lower courts have
applied Title VII's judicially created defenses to the ADEA.' 46 To the
extent that Congress provided all the possible defenses by statute for the
ADEA, however, grafting defenses judicially created for Title VII onto
the ADEA was unnecessary and has undermined the statutory scheme of
the ADEA.
Title VII and the ADEA do have some statutory defenses in
common. Both statutes allow the employer to act pursuant to a bona fide
seniority system or because of a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ). 47 For purposes of this article, the only important defense under
the ADEA, found under both Acts, is the defense of BFOQ. Under Title
VII, an employer may explicitly use sex, national origin or religion (but
not race) as a basis for distinction if such characteristic is a BFOQ. 8
Similarly, under the ADEA, the employer may take an employment
action based explicitly on the employee's age, such as mandatorily
retiring persons in the protected age group, if age is a BFOQ. 9 This
defense under both statutes is governed by the same decisional law and is
narrowly construed.' Therefore, under both statutes, the BFOQ defense
must be interposed if the employer acts explicitly based on the
employees' membership in the protected class.
Beyond the defenses of bona fide seniority system and BFOQ, other
ADEA defenses are not found in Title VII. Under the ADEA and not
explicitly under Title VII, therefore, the employer may make decisions
based on a bona fide employee benefit plan,'' for good cause,'52 and
143. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
144. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
145. See discussion supra accompanying notes 54-57.
146. See supra notes 69 & 77; infra note 247; discussion infra accompanying notes 177-78.
147. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 62 3 (f) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(e), (h).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(e). See supra note 141.
149. See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 423 (1985).
i5o. The Supreme Court has said that "[t]he BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has
read it narrowly [citing Title VII and ADEA cases]. We have read the BFOQ language of § 4(f) of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 5967 (ADEA), which tracks the BFOQ provision in Title
VII, just as narrowly." UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (19i) (citation omitted).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2). Congress was concerned that employers would be reluctant to hire and
retain older employees because their benefits could be more costly. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at
249-50. In addition, Congress specifically added to the bona fide employee benefit plan exception that
it could not be used to refuse to hire or to mandatorily retire any employee. Id. This provision allows
employers to adjust benefits for older employees so that in this regard they do not cost more than
younger employees. The presence of this defense also indicates that Congress was assuming that cost
would not otherwise be a defense to an ADEA action. Id. In fact, shortly after the Act, efforts to rely
on the higher costs often associated with older workers "generated particularly emphatic rejection in
most instances." Eglit, supra note 38, at 183-84. See supra note 142 for full text of the section.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3). There is no statutory equivalent under Title VII for disciplines or
discharges for "good cause;" rather the employer may interpose the legitimate nondiscriminatory
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based on "reasonable factors other than age."'53 Where in this scheme
should the RFOA defense fit? Logically, for any other situation in which
one of the other defenses is not appropriate, the defense should be
RFOA. Thus, RFOA would be the defense to any action for which the
defenses of good cause, bona fide seniority system, bona fide benefit
system or BFOQ are not applicable.
If the employer uses age as an explicit criterion, the defense of
BFOQ,'54 rather than RFOA,"5 must be interposed. On the other hand, if
the employment criterion is strongly correlated with age, the employer
should justify it using the RFOA defense. However, because courts have
grafted the Title VII defenses onto the ADEA, the defense of legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason rather than RFOA has been substituted as the
usual justification for employer actions.",6 RFOA has been ignored and
misinterpreted, principally because of the almost universal application of
the defense of legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to the ADEA."7
Under the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense of Title VII,
developed by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"" if the
defendant is acting based on a reason other than the plaintiff's protected
class, the defendant is not guilty of intentional discrimination.'59
However, under Title VII, if the defendant is not intentionally
discriminating but his selection criteria nevertheless have a disparate
impact on the plaintiff's protected class, the defendant is guilty of
discrimination unless he justifies the use of such criteria as a business
necessity." Business necessity is the other judicially-created defense
developed in the absence of general statutory defenses for Title VII. Due
to their importance to this discussion, these defenses and their
relationship to RFOA will be discussed in some detail below.
Because Congress provided little guidance for analyzing a
reason defense under decisional law. See discussion infra accompanying notes 158-67. Professor
Howard Eglit has opined that the addition of the good cause defense was "a form of statutory
insurance-assuring any doubters that indeed the ADEA does not constitute an impediment to
discharge based on cause. In any event, it seems proper to regard discharge for good cause simply as
one particular subspecies of reasonable factors other than age." Eglit, supra note 38, at 179.
Furthermore, because of the application to the ADEA of Title VII's legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason defense, "good cause" has become unnecessary because discharge for good cause would be a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1).
154. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187. Compare Johnson v. New York, 49 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that a policy which correlated perfectly with age must be justified using the BFOQ
analysis), with DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 727 (3d Cir. 1995) (indicating that
"a plan cannot be said to be facially discriminatory [if it] required referencing a fact outside the
ADEA").
155. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 11I, 122-23 (i985).
I56. See Eglit, supra note 38, at 169-7o.
157. Id.
158. 411 U.S. 792 (I973).
159. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993).
16o. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (197).
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circumstantial evidence case of disparate treatment under Title VII, the
Supreme Court developed the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
defense when it constructed a model of proof for disparate treatment in
McDonnell Douglas.I6, In establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff
must show that i) he was a member of a protected class; 2) he applied
and was qualified for a position for which the employer was seeking
applicants; 3) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 4) the
employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's
qualifications. 62 The Court later explained that if the plaintiff eliminated
the common causes for rejection-lack of qualifications and
unavailability of a position-the most likely reason remaining for the
decision was discrimination. '63 Thus, satisfying the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie case is sufficient to require some explanation from the
employer, who must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
rejecting the plaintiff.' 64
The Court later clarified that the employer must produce evidence
of a reason for rejecting the plaintiff, but need not persuade the court
that she was motivated by that particular reason. 6' The Court said that
the plaintiff's initial burden was not onerous and that the burden of
persuasion remains on the plaintiff at all times. '66 Once the employer
produces evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff
bears the burden of persuading the court that the reason given by the
employer was not the true reason for the employer's action, but rather
was a pretext for discrimination.' 67
Again, Congress provided all the necessary defenses for the ADEA,
and unlike Title VII, the ADEA did not need judicially-created defenses.
Nevertheless, the courts generally apply the Title VII defenses of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and business necessity to the
ADEA,' 9 which have now taken the place that should have been filled
by RFOA.
i6i. 411 U.S. at 792.
162. Id. at 802. The Court noted that there are other ways to prove a prima facie case. Id. at 802
n.13. For a good discussion of burdens of proof, see Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in
Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1235-40 (0981).
163. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253--54 (s98i). That proposition may be
debatable at this point in time for Title VII cases, as well as ADEA cases, but that is beyond the scope
of this article.
164. Id. at 253.
165. Id. at 254.
166. Id. at 253.
t67. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993). In that case, the Court said that the
trier of fact may resolve the ultimate issue of discrimination vel non based on its disbelief of the employer's
reason for its action, but that such disbelief does not necessarily satisfy the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
proving discrimination. Id The plaintiff must prove not only that the employer's reasons were untrue, but
that they were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 514-I5.
168. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 497-98.
169. See supra note 69.
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Business necessity is currently less often recognized as a defense
because of the controversy surrounding the applicability of the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA, but some courts still apply the defense to
the ADEA."7 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"' the Supreme Court held
that business necessity is the defense to a claim of disparate impact under
Title VII. The Court first articulated the theory of disparate impact in the
Griggs case, so that if the employer uses an employment criterion that
has a disparate impact on a protected class under Title VII, the employer
must justify it as a business necessity.'72 Business necessity generally
means that the employer must prove that the employment criterion
having the disparate impact was job-related, that is, that the criterion
predicted success in the job. "'73
Business necessity comports more with RFOA than does legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. As opposed to legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, which does not have to be reasonable, business necessity requires
the employer to justify the reason as related in some way to his
employment requirements. Shortly after the ADEA was enacted, the
Secretary of Labor, who was originally responsible for administering the
170. See supra notes 77 and soi.
171. 401 U.S. 424,431 (970.
172. Id.
173. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 39-45 for a discussion of the meaning of business necessity.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989),
proof of business necessity usually required at least that the employer prove that the employment
criterion was job-related, that is, that the criterion predicted success in the job. See SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 112-14. The Supreme Court has not provided a well-defined meaning of
business necessity. Id. In Griggs, the Court said the employer had to prove "business necessity," then
said that the employer had to show a "manifest relationship to the employment in question." 401 U.S.
at 431-32. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (I975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 16o7.4(c)),
the Court said that the message of the EEOC's Selection Guidelines is that "discriminatory tests are
impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be 'predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs
for which candidates are being evaluated."' Thus, the Supreme Court at this point had sent mixed
signals regarding the meaning of business necessity.
In Wards Cove, however, the Supreme Court said that the employer's burden of proof was to
show "whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer.... A mere insubstantial justification ... will not suffice .... [but] there is no
requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's
business .. 490 U.S. at 659 (citations omitted).
Wards Cove served as a primary reason for passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Civil Rights
Act of i99i, Pub. L. No. 102-66, io5 Stat. 1071 (991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). Congress then codified the disparate impact test and clarified the burden of proof by
providing that once the plaintiff has shown disparate impact, the employer must bear the burden of
proof and persuasion to show that the practice is "job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). It is not at all clear what Congress
intended by adding this definition and the consternation is further exacerbated by Congress' inclusion
in the legislation of a memorandum which indicated that its sole intent regarding business necessity
was to return to the law before Wards Cove and that other legislative history had no effect. See id. As
set forth above, the law was not at all clear before Wards Cove, so the memorandum is not very
helpful.
[Vol. 55:1399
June 2004] REHABILITATE THE ADEA 1427
ADEA, issued guidelines providing that to be an RFOA, the criterion
must be "'reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed' or
'shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements." 'I74 Thus, that
the RFOA should require proof of a business reason is supported by "the
Department of Labor's contemporaneous understanding of the newly
passed statute [which] is unusually germane, given its involvement and
influence in the legislation."' 7' The ADEA's defense to a disparate
impact case should be RFOA, not business necessity.
I76
If the ADEA were being interpreted in a vacuum, the most obvious
function for the RFOA defense would be to assume the roles taken by
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and business necessity under Title
VII. With regard to the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason defense,
while the Supreme Court continues to "assume without deciding" that
McDonnell Douglas applies to the ADEA,77 the overwhelming majority
of courts have applied the McDonnell Douglas model of proof to the
ADEA.78 Thus, instead of requiring the employer to interpose an RFOA
whenever the plaintiff proves a prima facie case under the ADEA, the
employer need only articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
This reason can be anything that on its face does not discriminate based
on age. " 9 If the reason is facially discriminatory, then the employer must
prove BFOQ.' 8° Certainly, "reasonable factor other than age" assumes a
higher burden of proof for the defendant than legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, which need not be reasonable. In fact, in
Hazen Paper, the Court said that an "improper" reason can be a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, as long as it is not facially
discriminatory.''
RFOA cannot simply be judicially eliminated from the statute as a
defense and replaced in all cases with the legitimate nondiscriminatory
174. Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 302-03 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 86o.Io3(f) (1986)). See supra note
133.
175. Id.
176. See discussion infra accompanying notes 265-66.
177. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2ooo) (citations omitted), for
example, the Supreme Court said that "[t]his Court has not squarely addressed whether the
McDonnell Douglas framework, developed to assess claims brought under § 703(a)(i) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also applies to ADEA actions." The Court in Reeves had also assumed
without deciding that McDonnell Douglas applied to the ADEA in O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (I996) and St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 5o6 n.i (1993). Id. at
142-43. It seems ironic that the Court has made important interpretations of McDonnell Douglas in
ADEA cases without deciding whether McDonnell Douglas even applies.
178. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 497.
179. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 6o4, 612 (noting a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
can be any reason, regardless of how improper or illegal as long as it does not violate the particular act
under which the plaintiff is suing). The Court said, "[f]or example, it cannot be true that an employer
who fires an older black worker because the worker is black thereby violates the ADEA. The
employee's race is an improper reason, but it is improper under Title VII, not the ADEA." Id.
18o. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)() (2ooo). See Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 4oo (1985).
181. 507 U.S. at 612.
reason defense imported from Title VII, which has no statutory analogue
to RFOA. Instead, the RFOA defense should preclude the use of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason as a defense because Congress
explicitly required the employer's reason to be reasonable in the
language of the RFOA defense.
The fact that the Court continues "to assume without deciding" that
McDonnell Douglas applies to ADEA cases ' does not preclude the
Court from deciding ultimately that it does not. It would be ironic indeed
if the Court decides that legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is the
defense to disparate treatment in all cases under the ADEA and then
also decides that disparate impact does not apply to ADEA cases
because of the RFOA defense. In that event, RFOA would never be
interposed and would be surplusage. Congress cannot have intended that
result.
There is another resolution, which I favor, that involves continuing
to apply McDonnell Douglas to the ADEA. If the plaintiff is able only to
produce evidence sufficient to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case (showing his membership in the protected class, applying and being
rejected for an available position), this should be insufficient to require
the employer to shoulder the burden of persuasion to prove RFOA. As
the Court has said, the plaintiff's burden to show a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas is not onerous.'83 In that case, retaining the
McDonnell Douglas method of proof would be logical because the
plaintiff has not adduced strong evidence of discrimination. Only in the
case in which the plaintiff has proven a more obvious connection
between the employer's action and the plaintiff's age should the
employer have to prove RFOA.'s
The conflict can be resolved, therefore, without eliminating years of
precedent in which the courts have applied legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason as the principal defense to ADEA disparate treatment cases.
Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason and the McDonnell Douglas order
of proof could continue to apply to claims of intentional discrimination in
which the plaintiff has only adduced a bare prima facie case under
182. See supra note 177.
183. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (i981).
184. Eglit, supra note 38, at 218-i9. Professor Eglit said that the RFOA defense should be a
variable defense, depending on the context. Id. at 219. I think that a more acceptable solution would
be to interpret the RFOA defense to require the same amount of proof in every situation, but that it
should only be used when an affirmative defense is appropriate. Thus, the RFOA defense should be
the defense to the use of an age-correlated factor, and, as Professor Eglit recommended in his article in
1986, RFOA should be an affirmative defense when a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact, a
pattern or practice of discrimination is involved, or when there is direct evidence of discrimination: In
other words, when the plaintiff has shown more of a connection between age discrimination and the
challenged employment action than the plaintiff is required to show to satisfy a bare McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case. Id. at 196. See supra text accompanying notes 161-67 for a discussion of the
McDonnell Douglas order of proof.
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McDonnell Douglas. In a case involving more substantial proof of
discrimination such as the use of age-correlated criteria, the burden of
persuasion should shift to the defendant to prove RFOA.'5 If the
statutory scheme of the ADEA is to have any meaning, RFOA must be
interposed as an affirmative defense to the use of age-correlated criteria,
either under the disparate treatment theory or the disparate impact
theory or both.
Shortly after the ADEA was enacted, the majority of courts that
considered age-correlated factors, such as seniority and higher salary,
recognized that these factors so obviously correlated with age that the
employer must have intended to discriminate by using such a factor.'8 It
seems logical that if these courts, as well as the Secretary of Labor' and
the EEOC,' thought so, it is not unlikely that Congress thought so, too.
Courts cannot simply at this point in time put on blinders and refuse to
see the reality of the situation that these earlier authorities recognized.
Before Hazen Paper, the prevailing view was that to qualify as an
RFOA, the factor could not be correlated with age."" As Professor Mack
Player said, factors which are "inherently time-based, such as experience,
years on the job, and tenure... are inherently age-related and thus
cannot be considered 'factors other than age.""'  The lower courts
generally followed this position prior to Hazen Paper.'9'
Some courts went too far and decided that age-correlated criteria
were discriminatory per se. 92 These courts were incorrect, as Hazen
Paper confirmed."9 Congress certainly intended that employers' business
justifications should be considered."9 The opposite position is just as
untenable, however, and the lower courts have swung to this opposite
extreme by ignoring altogether the evidentiary value of the use of an age-
correlated factor'95 and even allowing an age-correlated factor to serve as
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason'96
In adding the RFOA defense, Congress was apparently concerned
with both employees and employers."9 With regard to employees,
185. Eglit, supra note 38, at 196.
I86. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 27-29.
187. See supra note 133.
188. See supra note 134.
189. See cases cited supra note 69; Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261, 1274-78
(1983). Professor Player thought that RFOA as here defined should be the defense to disparate impact
cases under the ADEA. Id. at 1278-83.
i9o. Id. at 1278.
191. See supra note 69.
192. See supra note 69.
593. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 608-09 (i993).
194. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 289; see also infra text accompanying notes 197-98.
195. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 231-32.
I96. See infra Section VI.
197. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 288-98.
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Congress directed its concern at arbitrary discrimination that caused
older employees to lose their jobs and to become unemployable.' g With
regard to employers, Congress wanted them to be able to make decisions
based on reasonable factors other than age, so that employers would not
be forced to retain employees who cannot perform. A balance must be
struck here.
Hazen Paper is correct that the use of age-correlated factors should
not be treated as discriminatory per se; however, the employer should
have to justify the use of age-correlated factors. Only by ignoring the
word "reasonable" can the argument be made that the ADEA allows the
employer to defend by relying on any factor other than age, thus not only
precluding disparate impact, but allowing the employer to utilize
unjustified age-correlated factors. The very presence of the RFOA
defense demonstrates that Congress intended that the use of a factor that
implicated age should have to be justified as reasonable. Because it is an
affirmative defense, the conclusion is inescapable that the employer must
have a business reason to justify using a factor that implicates age. Unless
the employer is required to justify the use of an obviously age-correlated
factor under some theory of discrimination, there is otherwise no place
for the RFOA defense, and the statutory scheme will be irreparably
damaged.
RFOA is not the appropriate defense if the employer explicitly uses
age as a criterion; instead, the defense should be BFOQ. The courts are
having a problem finding a place for RFOA. In fact they do not even
appear to be looking."9 If Hazen Paper does not allow RFOA to be used
in the intentional discrimination situation, then it is even more obvious
that disparate impact must apply to the ADEA to defend the use of an
obviously age-correlated factor or a factor shown to be age-correlated in
a particular situation.
Even if the Supreme Court ultimately recognizes disparate impact
under the ADEA, without properly applying RFOA, the ADEA will
retain inconsistencies. If the Court determines that disparate impact does
not apply, the ADEA statutory scheme will be virtually destroyed, as the
lower courts are currently accomplishing. Employers will be able to
interpose an age-correlated factor as a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason, which the employee would have to prove was a pretext for
discrimination. The fact that the age-correlated factor has an obvious
disparate impact would be irrelevant.
B. ARGUMENT THAT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADEA PRECLUDES
DISPARATE IMPACT
Despite the congressional mandate to forbid age discrimination,
198. Id.
199. Eglit, supra note 38, at 155-6o.
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courts are parsing the legislative history to justify allowing discriminatory
practices that impede the employment of older workers." ° In Ellis v.
United Airlines, Inc., for example, the Tenth Circuit said that the report
by the Secretary of Labor that preceded the passage of the ADEA
differentiated between arbitrary or intentional discrimination and
problems that result from factors that affect older workers more
adversely."' The court said that the report recommended that workers be
protected only from intentional or arbitrary discrimination by the
ADEA and that other measures should be undertaken to correct
practices that affect older workers adversely."2 The ADEA's stated
purposes also reflect a different approach to these problems, according
to Ellis.°2
In Adams v. Florida Power Corp., the Eleventh Circuit adopted this
same rationale .2 ' However, Judge Barkett, specially concurring,
responded to the contention that the ADEA was not designed to correct
discrimination based on the use of factors that adversely affect older
workers." The concurrence said, with reference to the majority's citation
of the report of the Secretary of Labor, that the report
differentiated between what it termed "arbitrary discrimination"
based on age and problems resulting from factors that "affect older
workers more strongly, as a group, than they do younger employees."
The majority concludes that this precludes disparate impact claims
because these are claims that only address "factors that affect older
workers more strongly," not arbitrary discrimination. But this begs the
question. The very question disparate impact analysis seeks to answer
is whether the challenged policy that disproportionately impacts older
workers is derived from a reasonable business.udgment or whether the
policy is the result of arbitrary discrimination.
In formulating the disparate impact theory, Griggs itself said that the
theory was designed to ferret out arbitrary discrimination.'
As set out more fully in my earlier article,"8 Professors Kaminshine' °
and Blumrosen" ° have written excellent articles on the legislative intent
200. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1322 (iith Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 534
U.S. 1054 (2001), and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 535 U.S. 228 (2002); Mullin v. Raytheon
Co., 164 F.3d 696,696 (ist Cir. i999); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F-3 d 999 (roth Cir. 1996).
201. Ellis, 73 F.3d at ioo8.
202. Id.
203. Id. at ioo7.
204. Adams, 255 F.3d at 1322-26.
205. Id. at 1330.
206. Id. (citations omitted).
207. Id. at 1330 (Barkett, J., specially concurring). Judge Barkett was referring to the statement in
Griggs that said "[w]hat is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or
other impermissible classification." 401 U.S. 424.431 (1971).
208. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 48-51.
209. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 235, 287-306.
210. See BLUMROSEN, supra note 55, at 73.
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regarding disparate impact and the ADEA, coming to opposite
conclusions. Professor Blumrosen decided that Congress identified two
types of discrimination against older people: the setting of arbitrary age
limits and other practices that disadvantaged older people.21' His
conclusion was that in enacting the ADEA, Congress intended to
prohibit the setting of arbitrary age limits, which would forbid only
intentional discrimination, and to deal with other types of disadvantages
in other ways."'
Professor Kaminshine surveyed the legislative history and found no
persuasive support for the conclusion reached by Professor Blumrosen,
that Congress intended to foreclose disparate impact as a theory of
liability for ADEA. 13 Professor Kaminshine found that Congress was
anxious that employers consider older people based on ability and not on
stereotyped views of the effects of the aging process.214 He concluded that
the legislative history is consistent with the view that Congress did not
intend to allow employers to use age-correlated criteria that do not relate
to ability."5
Professor Kaminshine has the better position. In response to
Professor Blumrosen's contention that Congress was concerned only
with the setting of arbitrary age limits, Professor Kaminshine contends
that if Congress was concerned with arbitrary age limits, it simply could
have prohibited such age limits instead of copying the broad Title VII
proscriptions into the ADEA.I 6
Regardless of which view one accepts, the legislative history is not
sufficiently clear on this point to provide a resolution of the argument.
Because the Supreme Court interpreted § 703(a)(2) of Title VII to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disparate impact, the fact that the
ADEA contains the same provision in § 4(a)(2) must end the debate and
make the legislative history fairly irrelevant. It is impossible to say that
Congress intended to foreclose disparate impact as a theory of
discrimination for the ADEA when it used the same provision for both
statutes. As discussed above, the prohibitory language is plain and, in the
absence of some other provision, § 703(a)(2) and § 4(a)(2) simply cannot
211. Id. at 77.
212. Id. at 114-15.
213. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 287-95.
214- Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 299. See also Eglit, supra note 38, at 221, for the view that Congress meant to include
practices which commonly have a disparate impact on older people as "arbitrary" age discrimination.
Professor Eglit acknowledges that Congress did find age discrimination to be different from race
discrimination, but the "fact that an employer does not overtly rely upon age as a basis for
decisionmaking does not necessarily diminish the opportunity for inflicting harm.... Age distinctions
are particularly unique because they so often are used thoughtlessly rather than as intentional
expressions of invidious malice or even mildly bigoted intent." Id. at 222.
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be interpreted to have different meanings."7
The argument that the statute itself prohibits disparate impact must
then depend on RFOA as indicating Congressional intent to prohibit
disparate impact for the ADEA. As set forth above, if Congress had
meant that "any" factor other than age would be a defense, it knew how
to say so, as it did in the EPA.218 The defense of RFOA stands squarely in
the way of reading Hazen Paper to allow an unjustified (or
unreasonable) factor other than age as a defense to a disparate treatment
case and to disallow disparate impact. Again, RFOA must be accorded
its proper role in the statutory scheme. Lower courts have been
ineffective in this regard, especially since Hazen Paper.
C. RATIONALES BASED ON HAZEN PAPER
The part of Hazen Paper that discussed age-correlated factors
contains about ten paragraphs. 19 The defense of RFOA was not the
question nor did the Court refer to it. Similarly, the Court plainly said
the case did not involve disparate impact.220 Thus, Hazen Paper simply
cannot be interpreted to eviscerate the statutory scheme of the ADEA
by precluding disparate impact and holding that RFOA means any factor
other than age.
Several courts have nevertheless concluded that Hazen Paper
precludes the application of the disparate impact theory to the ADEA.2 '
In Adams v. Florida Power Corp., the Eleventh Circuit said that in
Hazen Paper, "the Supreme Court explicitly left open the question of
'whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA ..... .In the face of this statement, the court inexplicably went on
to determine that Hazen Paper nevertheless precludes the use of
disparate impact under the ADEA based on two other statements by the
Supreme Court in Hazen Paper, both of which were limited to cases of
disparate treatment. 3
First, the Adams court, mimicking other lower courts, cited the
holding in Hazen Paper, in which the Court said that basing an
employment decision on any factor other than age is not intentional age
217. See supra Section V.A.i.
218. See supra Section V.A.2.a.
219. 507 U.S. 604,609-15 (I993).
220. Id. at61o-12.
221. In Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3 d 696, 700 (Ist Cir. '999), Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73
F.3 d 999, ioo6-o7 (ioth Cir. 1996), and EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1075-77 (7th
Cir. 1994), the courts cited Hazen Paper as support for deciding that the disparate impact theory does
not apply to the ADEA. In Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047-48 (6th Cir.
1998) (quoting Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n & Profl Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995)),
the Sixth Circuit cited Hazen Paper for the proposition that there is "considerable doubt" as to
whether a disparate impact claim can be brought under the ADEA.
222. 255 F.3d 1322, 1325 (1 ith Cir. 2001) (citing Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 61o).
223. Id. at 1326.
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discrimination, as support for concluding that the Court in Hazen Paper
intended to preclude disparate impact.2 4 The second statement these
courts cite from Hazen Paper is that "disparate treatment.., captures
the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit under the ADEA."''
Both statements were taken out of context and were clearly referring to
disparate treatment and whether the use of age-correlated factors was
discriminatory per se.
Neither of these statements from Hazen Paper supports, much less
precludes, the application of disparate impact to the ADEA. Even the
concurrence in Hazen Paper said that there were substantial reasons why
the disparate impact theory should not apply, but did not say that the
theory did not in fact apply."'
Since Hazen Paper, the courts have devised some additional
arguments that disparate impact should not apply to the ADEA. The
principal new arguments are based on aspects of Congressional intent in
passing the ADEA and Title VII (other than that discussed earlier2 7)
and on the passage of the Civil Rights Act of i99 I.228
D. OTHER RATIONALES CONTRIVED BY THE COURTS SINCE HAZEN PAPER
I. Title VII was designed to eliminate past discriminatory practices,
while age discrimination correlates with contemporaneous
discriminatory practices
In Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,29 the First Circuit said that Congress
enacted Title VII to correct past discrimination and, therefore, only
prohibited practices that had a disparate impact on victims of past
discrimination. 3 This being the case, the court had "ample reason to
construe the language of Title VII to bar such practices. 23 The court
said that age discrimination "correlates with contemporaneous
employment-related conditions, not past discriminatory practices' 232 and
that Congress was trying "to protect older workers against the disparate
224. Id. at 1325.
225. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 61o.
226. 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
227. See supra Section V.B.
228. There is a third argument presented in Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, ioo9 (ioth
Cir. 1996), and followed in Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3 d 696, 700 (Ist Cir. 1999), that there was
difficulty in defining a class under the ADEA because "the line defining the class that is disparately
impacted by a challenged policy is an imprecise one, which could be manipulated to either strengthen
or weaken the impact of a policy on some age group." While it may be true that some facially neutral
factors will have different impacts on different age groups, this hardly seems to be a cogent reason for
deciding that Congress never intended that the theory should apply. See infra text accompanying notes
3o6-o8 for a further discussion of this issue.
229. 164 F.3d at 699-704, in which the First Circuit said that disparate impact did not apply to the
ADEA.




treatment that resulted from stereotyping them as less productive and
therefore less valuable members of the work force because of their
advancing years." 33
The obvious answer to this contention, again, is that the language
construed under Title VII to authorize disparate impact is
indistinguishable from the same language Congress used in the ADEA
34
Regardless of the speculation regarding Congressional intent, the same
language cannot be construed differently without a clear Congressional
mandate, and the legislative history is far from clear, as set out above. 3
Furthermore, past discrimination is not a requirement for a disparate
impact case under Title VII.
236
Disparate impact may be viewed from two perspectives: that it
ferrets out intentional discrimination that cannot be proven by the
disparate treatment model or that it simply removes barriers to
employment opportunity whether intentionally or unintentionally
imposed. 37 According to another possibility, disparate impact is the only
. . . . . 238
theory that reaches subconscious d2sc3miation.
Age discrimination, in common with other types of discrimination,
involves "a systematic undervaluation by the dominant culture of
workers, motivated by stereotypical thinking about old people, people of
color, women, gays, lesbians and other groups., 239 In fact, as Congress
noted, age stereotyping is a particular problem for older workers.24 "Age
distinctions are particularly unique because they so often are used
thoughtlessly rather than as intentional expressions of invidious malice
or even mildly bigoted intent." 4' Stereotyping can often only be
effectively identified using the disparate impact theory.
However one views the purpose of the disparate impact theory, it is
clear that courts have applied the theory in many situations that do not
involve past discrimination' and that the argument that the disparate
impact theory does not apply to the ADEA on this basis is simply wrong.
Similarly misguided is the view that Congressional failure to explicitly
233. Id.
234. See supra Section V.A.i.
235. See supra Section V.A.i.
236. See generally McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that
white males were covered by Title VII, despite the fact that they had not been the victims of past
discrimination).
237. See generally Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 311-21, for an excellent discussion of this issue.
238. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
239. Minda, supra note I, at 566.
240. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). "Congress' promulgation of the ADEA
was prompted by its concern that older workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes." Id.
241. Eglit, supra note 38, at 222.
242. See Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 317. For example, strength and size requirements that
discriminate against women are not based on past discrimination, but rather are disqualifying traits
that are linked to sex. See id.
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include the ADEA in the i99I amendments pertaining to disparate
impact precludes the theory for the ADEA.
2. In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress amended Title VII to codify
the disparate impact theory and did not include the ADEA
In the late I98os, the Supreme Court decided a series of Title VII
cases that were considered "detrimental to federal civil rights
protections,""3 and which roused Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act of
I99I (the "1991 Act") to remedy the effect of these decisions."2 The 442
Act was particularly directed245 at Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,' a
case involving disparate impact. The I99I Act specifically amended Title
VII, not the ADEA, at least in part because Wards Cove was a Title VII
case.247
Before the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove, it was generally
agreed that once the plaintiff demonstrated a prima facie case by
showing that an employment practice had an adverse impact, the
employer had to bear the burden of proof and persuasion to show that
the practice was justified by business necessity.4' The Supreme Court
announced in Wards Cove, among other things, that the burden of
persuasion should remain at all times on the plaintiff. 49
The Statement of Congressional Findings in the 1991 Act states that,
"the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights
protections. '" 5 Congress then codified the disparate impact test and
243. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, io5 Stat. 1071 (IgI) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe).
244. See Eglit, supra note 57, at 1129-3o.
245. Id.
246. 490 U.S. 642,642-44 (1989), superseded in part by statute.
247. Id. The Supreme Court has never decided a case that involved disparate impact under the
ADEA, although the theory has been applied by most lower courts to the ADEA by analogy to Title
VII. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 61o 0993). See also cases cited supra note 77.
248. Eglit, supra note 57, at 1129-30.
249. 490 U.S. at 657-59. Wards Cove made a disparate impact case more difficult to prove
principally by i) requiring the plaintiff to identify the criterion causing the disparate impact, 2)
requiring the employer simply to articulate her defense rather than to bear the burden of persuasion,
and 3) requiring the employer to show only that the criterion having the disparate impact significantly
serves the employer's employment goals and need not be essential to the business. Id. Wards Cove also
added more to the requirement of alternative business practice:
Of course, any alternative practices which respondents offer up in this respect must be
equally effective as petitioners' chosen hiring procedures in achieving petitioners' legitimate
employment goals. Moreover, '[flactors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed
alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer's legitimate business goals.'
Id. at 66I (citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988)). In addition, in order
for the plaintiff to prevail at this point, the defendant must "refuse to adopt these alternatives." Id. at
66o-61.
250. Civil Rights Act of i99i, Pub. L. No. 102-166, lO5 Stat. 1O71 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2oooe) (citations omitted). The Statement of Congressional Findings states in section 2:
The Congress finds that-
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clarified the burden of proof by providing that, once the plaintiff has
shown disparate impact, the employer must bear the burden of proof and
persuasion to show that the practice is "job related to the position in
question and consistent with business necessity. 2..
Since the amendments that overruled Wards Cove for Title VII did
not specifically include the ADEA, the question has been raised as to
whether the i991 Act model of proof for disparate impact applies to the
ADEA or whether the Wards Cove model of proof applies to the
ADEA 52 The current contention of some lower courts that Congress
was intending to send a message in the i99I Act that the disparate
impact model does not apply at all to the ADEA has never been
seriously considered in the scholarship.53 Nevertheless, the scholarship
(i) additional remedies under Federal Law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace;
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination
in employment.
Id.
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 200oe-2(k) (Supp. III I99I), which in whole states:
(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases.
(i)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under
this subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C) with
respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.
(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a
disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall
demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact,
except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice.
(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does not cause the
disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such practice is
required by business necessity.
(C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in accordance with the
law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept of "alternative employment
practice".
(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business necessity may not
be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this subchapter.
Section 2oooe(m) states: "The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burden of production and
persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe(m) (Supp. V. 1993).
252. See Eglit, supra note 57, at 1149-50.
253. See infra text accompanying note 250. "'[Tlhe Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned the
lower courts as to the dangers inherent in attempting to infer some affirmative intention from
congressional silence or inaction.' Congress simply may not have given adequate consideration to the
issue of whether the disparate impact doctrine should be extended to the ADEA." Douglas C.
Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Applying the Disparate Impact
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concerning whether Wards Cove applies to the ADEA is equally
applicable on this point.
Professor Howard Eglit wrote the most complete article on the
effect of the i99i Act on the ADEA and why Congress did not include
the ADEA in the amendments that codified disparate impact.254 It is
clear in his discussion of the legislative history that there is no support
for the proposition that Congress was sending some kind of message that
disparate impact did not apply at all to the ADEA. Because Professor
Eglit's article provided extensive treatment of the effect of the i99gi Act
on the ADEA, the fact that he did not discuss the possibility that the
i99i Act precluded disparate impact altogether leads to the conclusion
that he found no support for the proposition."'
The question that primarily concerned Professor Eglit was whether
and why Congress left the ADEA to the mercy of Wards Cove in the face
of the Statement of Congressional Findings that the case had weakened
the protections of Federal Civil Rights Laws.256 He exhaustively surveyed
the legislative history and other sources for evidence of why Congress
amended Title VII and not the ADEA in this regard. He notes that there
is scant legislative history to guide the resolution. 57
The most obvious reasons are either that there was no need to
amend the ADEA because Wards Cove is not an ADEA case or that
Congress merely overlooked the ADEA. Professor Eglit, however, was
not persuaded by either of these reasons because the ADEA clearly
follows Title VII jurisprudence,"' and Congress amended the ADEA in
other parts of the i99i Act. 59 Professor Eglit concluded that in this case,
legislative silence indicates acquiescence, and unless the Supreme Court
abandons Wards Cove or Congress amends the ADEA, Wards Cove
applies to the ADEA.2'6
Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 649 (1996) (quoting Hiatt v. Union Pac.
R.R., 859 F. Supp. I416, 1435 (D. Wyo. 1994), aff'd on other grounds, 65 F.3 d 838 (0oth Cit. i995)).
The authors' "pragmatic argument" in this article relates to why Congress limited damages under the
1991 Act to cases of intentional discrimination. The authors' contention is that Congress did not want
to require a jury trial for disparate impact cases under Title VII because they involve the resolution of
complicated statistical evidence. Id. at 628. Thus, it follows that disparate impact should not apply to
the ADEA which allows damages for all types of cases. I believe that it is more likely that Congress
was more concerned with limiting damages to cases of intentional discrimination, not whether juries
would be confused by statistical evidence in disparate impact cases.
254. See Eglit, supra note 57 at 1093-1216.
255. Id. at io99 n.i8. Professor Eglit notes that there is a "modicum" of authority that disparate
impact does not apply to the ADEA. Id. Other than this comment, he does not refer to the possibility
that the legislative history provides any support for the proposition. Id.
256. Civil Rights Act of i99 i , Pub. L. No. io2-i66, 1o5 Stat. 1071 (19') (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 20ooe).
257. See Eglit, supra note 57, at 1127.
258. Id. at 1174-75.
259. Id. at ilO6-25.
260. Id. at 1215. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 46 n.183, for another view and a further discussion.
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Other very good reasons exist for why Congress did not include the
ADEA in the disparate impact amendment to Title VII. First, at the time
Congress passed the I99I Act, the predecessor legislation, the Civil
Rights Act of 199o, had failed to win enough votes to override a
presidential veto. Substantial compromise was necessary to pass the i99I
Act."' Apparently, the most pressing objective for proponents of the
i991 Act was to reverse the effects of Wards Cove for Title VII cases.26 2
A few commentators and one member of the Supreme Court had already
expressed reservations about the application of the disparate impact
theory to the ADEA, 63 so amending the ADEA may not have been an
issue worth adding to the battle for passage of the i991 Act.2'
6
Second, the defense to a disparate impact case under the ADEA
should be RFOA,265 not business necessity, which was codified as the
defense to disparate impact for Title VII in the i99i Act. 66 A third
problem is that the I99I Act added punitive and compensatory damages
for Title VII to the equitable remedies previously available, but limited
such damages to disparate treatment cases.6' Remedies in disparate
impact cases remain exclusively equitable under Title VII,' 68 while the
ADEA provides for liquidated damages, regardless of the theory of the
case.26 Congress would have had obvious problems amending the
remedial provisions of the ADEA to be consistent with the remedies
added to Title VII by the 1991 Act.
Thus, Congress did not include the ADEA specifically in the
substantive amendments to Title VII. The reasons for this are far from
clear. Nevertheless, some courts have accepted the argument that
Congress was silently disapproving of the application of the disparate
impact theory to the ADEA. The courts' acceptance of this weak
argument,27 along with the other arguments discussed above, is changing
substantially the direction of ADEA jurisprudence.
261. See Caryn L. Lilling, Note, The Civil Rights Act of 199i: An Examination of the Storm
Preceding the Compromise of America's Civil Rights, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 215, 219-20 (1991).
262. See Civil Rights Act of 199I, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. lO71 (i9i) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2oooe).
263. See Markham v. Geller, 45I U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); BLUMROSEN, supra note 55; Krop, supra note 98.
264. This is especially likely since the law had been vetoed in the previous year, and Congress had
failed to override the veto. See Lilling, supra note 257, at 219-20. The Act passed only after much
compromising. Id.
265. See Player, supra note 189, at 1278-83. In my earlier article on this subject, I argued that
business necessity should be the defense to a disparate impact case under the ADEA. See Johnson,
supra note 2, at 6o. During the nine years which have intervened, I am now convinced that the defense
must be RFOA.
266. See supra Section V.D.2.
267. 42 U.S.C. § s98ia(a)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2oo0).
269. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)-(c) (2ooo).
270. See Eglit, supra note 57, at 1172-91, for an excellent discussion of the significance of
legislative silence.
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VI. LOWER COURT INTERPRETATION OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ADEA AFTER HAZEN PAPER
The lower courts were quick to apply the holding in Hazen Paper,
not only to conclude that age-correlated factors were no longer per se
intentionally discriminatory, 7 ' but also that age-correlated factors could
not be attacked using the disparate impact theory.272 In addition, courts
are now often declining to consider the use of age-correlated factors as
probative of age-discrimination at all and even regard an age-correlated
factor as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.273 The following recent
cases exemplify the damage that Hazen Paper has done to the statutory
scheme of the ADEA by allowing employers to use age-correlated
factors with virtual impunity.
For example, in Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff who was
over age forty was not hired by the airline as a flight attendant because
she exceeded the weight limit for new hires. 74 The airline used different
weight standards for its flight attendants, depending on whether they
were new hires or current employees. The standard for employees made
allowances for the fact that people generally gain weight as they age;
however, the standard for initial job applicants did not make allowance
for such weight-gain. 75 The plaintiff argued that the weight requirement
was intentionally discriminatory and that it had a disparate impact.276 The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on
both claims. 77 The court of appeals held that the disparate impact theory
does not apply to the ADEA27 8 and that the plaintiff had not shown that
the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of age because it
did not show that the standard did not screen out younger applicants.79
271. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 30-33.
272. See supra Section V.
273. See, e.g., Domb v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. oi Civ. 10074, 2003 WL 21878784, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2003). See generally Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (i993).
274. 73 F-3d 999, soot (ioth Cir. 1996).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1003.
277. Id.
278. Id. at ioo9.
279. The Ellis court said:
Given the age-sensitive criteria applied to flight attendants once hired, United's continued
use of age-neutral hiring criteria, at first glance, might make little sense; however, Unitedjustified this practice in the district court by asserting that it does not inquire into the age of
its applicants because, in many states, such an inquiry is illegal. In any event, an employer's
exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment does not, by itself, constitute
pretext.
Id. at ioo6.
Similarly, in Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 698 (ist Cir. 1999), the employer
conducted various cost-saving measures, including layoffs, plant closings, wage freezes and
reassignments. As part of its cost cutting plan, it "assayed the commensurability of upper-level salaried
employees' assigned labor grades and actual responsibilities." Id. at 698. The court affirmed the
summary judgment for the employer on the issue of disparate treatment, despite the obvious impact of
only considering higher salaried employees for demotion. Id. at 699.
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Obviously, if the plaintiff had been allowed to argue disparate
impact, the employer would have been required to prove a business
reason as an RFOA for the policy, which would have been difficult in
view of the fact that higher weight limits were tolerated for current
employees. This appeared to be an obvious case of age discrimination,
and the court's reliance on Hazen Paper allowed the employer to be
completely exonerated without having to justify the blatant use of a
factor that disadvantages older workers.
Using even more obvious factors, in EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., the plaintiff had identified the criteria that allegedly caused the
discrimination: salary, retirement eligibility and seniorty.o The Eighth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
employer and said that, even if correlated with age, such factors do not
constitute age discrimination.
With regard to the disparate treatment claim, the court said that no
reasonable jury could believe that there was a pattern or practice of age
discrimination.""2 The evidence showed that people over fifty-five were
twice as likely to be laid off as people under fifty-five. Several managers
testified that retirement eligibility was a factor and some managers' files
contained retirement-related data of employees, including age,
retirement date, and years of service. Employees also testified that they
were told they were being laid off because of their age, seniority, salary,
However, the Ninth Circuit took a different view in Arnett v. California Public Employees
Retirement System, 179 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 528 U.S. I I I 1 (2ooo), in which
the state provided disability benefits based on the employees' age at date of hire, with older employees
receiving less. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and
judgment on the pleadings and the court of appeals reversed. Id. at 692. The question was how Hazen
Paper applied to this case and whether the disparate impact theory could apply. The court said that the
Court in Hazen Paper said that years of service may be correlated with age, but not perfectly, because
younger employees could also have the same service. In Arnett the issue was not years of service but
age at employment which is based on, not just correlated with, age. Older employees received less in
disability benefits. This is the special case referred to in Hazen Paper in which the benefit depends on
age. Id. at 694. For example, the court said if the employee was hired at thirty, he received a disability
benefit of 50% of his retirement benefit which decreased by io% for each decade, becoming lo% for
someone hired at age fifty. Id. at 695.
The court then turned to the plaintiffs' argument that the lower court erred in dismissing the
disparate impact claim, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' disparate
impact claim. Id. at 696. The plaintiffs alleged that the consequences of the policy fell more harshly on
people over forty and that this adequately stated the claim. The defendant argued that the policy was
to save costs because the policy was directed at reducing the cost of providing disability benefits for
employees who would never likely accumulate enough years of service to receive that amount in
service retirement benefits. The court said whether this practice was a business necessity had to be
decided by the trial court. Id.
The Ninth Circuit continued to recognize disparate impact in ADEA cases after the Arnett
case was reversed on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845,
856 (9th Cir. 2000).
280. 191 F.3 d 948,951 (8th Cir. 1999).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 952.
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and retirement benefits. Other witnesses testified that the company
manipulated its evaluation system to evaluate older employees less
favorably than younger employees. The court nevertheless determined
that no reasonable jury could conclude that managers chose retirement-
eligible employees for the reduction in force (hereinafter "RIF") because
of their age even though retirement eligibility and salary were factors in
layoff decisions.3 The court stated, "[a]s we have already said
employment decisions motivated by factors other than age (such as
salary, seniority, or retirement eligibility), even when such factors
correlate with age, do not constitute age discrimination.
' 84
As other courts have recognized, factors such as retirement
eligibility do not merely correlate with age, they are actually based on
age and, thus, employers should be required to defend such factors as a
BFOQ.25 The Eight Circuit, in contrast, did not think these factors were
even evidence of age discrimination.
In another case, Broaddus v. Florida Power Corp.,6 the plaintiff was
terminated in a RIF, which he claimed violated the ADEA and ERISA.
The court dismissed the ERISA claim at the end of the evidence. In his
closing, the plaintiff's lawyer opined that the RIF was designed to get rid
of older higher-priced employees because salary generally increases with
age, as do costs of benefits such as retirement and health benefits.287 The
jury asked for clarification on whether they could consider evidence that
related to health issues since the ERISA claim had been dropped. The
judge replied that they could consider all the evidence, but only as it
related to age discriminaton.m
The Eleventh Circuit found the clarification insufficient based on
Hazen Paper and remanded for a new trial. The court relied on Hazen
Paper in stating that the ADEA does not prohibit decisions based on
"higher salaries, increased benefits, pension status, or claims for medical
expenses even though these characteristics are often correlated with an
employee's age. ''28 The court found that the closing statements which
283. Id. at 953.
284. Id. (citation omitted). The court discounted the remainder of the evidence as isolated. The
court also disregarded evidence that senior management officials expressed a strong preference for
younger employees. Furthermore, the EEOC presented various documents including a memorandum
from the president of the company in 1986 stating that the company had to attract and retain capable
young people to stay competitive; a 1989 document targeting candidates under forty years of age; and
other company documents expressing concern over the aging workforce and management team. Id.
The court found most, if not all, of this documentation too remote in time to be considered. Id. The
RIF at issue, however, occurred between t99t and 1993. Id. at 950.
285. See, e.g., Erie County Retirees Ass'n v. County of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 21 1 (3d Cir. 2000)
(analyzing medicare eligibility as criterion); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1542 (2d
Cir. 1996) (analyzing mandatory retirement policy).
286. 145 F.3d 1283 (1ith Cir. 1998).
287. Id. at 1285-86.
288. Id. at 1286.
289. Id. at 1287 (citation omitted).
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"insinuated that older workers often have increased medical costs and
that this factor plays a role in employers' decisions to terminate older
workers," misstated the law and improperly blurred the line between the
ADEA and ERISA claims.2
Hazen Paper did not state that age-correlated factors cannot violate
the ADEA, but rather that such factors are not per se discriminatory or,
at least, that there must be additional evidence to show that the factors
were used as a proxy for age discrimination.29' The Broaddus case,
however, finds the use of such factors irrelevant.
Even in circuits that nominally recognize disparate impact for
ADEA cases, plaintiffs meet with little success because of the restricted
application of the disparate impact theory.'92 In Criley v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., the court stated that the Second Circuit recognized disparate
impact, requiring the plaintiff prove that the criterion has a disparate
impact on the entire protected group, i.e., workers aged forty and over."
"Plaintiffs acknowledge that 94.1% of the pilots Delta hired were aged
forty and older and that the hiring scheme had no negative impact on the
overall group of Pan Am pilots aged 40 and older.... [thus], plaintiffs'
disparate impact claim cannot survive."'' 4 In the Criley case, the plaintiffs
complained that when Delta hired shuttle pilots from Pan American,
they used a seniority system that disadvantaged older pilots. Although
younger pilots were offered employment on the same basis, the plaintiffs
produced evidence of statements that suggested that Delta was
concerned about the economics of hiring older pilots who were near
retirement age. The Second Circuit held that under Hazen Paper, "an
employer's concern about the economic consequences of employment
decisions does not constitute age discrimination under the ADEA, even
though there may be a correlation with age." '95 The court found that to
the extent the comments cited by the plaintiffs implicated age, the
comments expressed concerns about the business effects of the plaintiffs'
ages, not assumptions about the plaintiffs' ability. The court concluded
that "[o]n the reasoning of Hazen, considering and acting on such factors
is not age discrimination.'" 6 If being concerned about the business
effects of the plaintiffs' ages is not age discrimination, what is?
Other recent decisions have rejected factors such as lack of or
limited computer skills,"f higher salary,' 8 overqualification or too much
290. Id.
291. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 613 (1993).
292. See Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1372-73 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
that the criterion must have a disparate impact on the whole protected class, not just a part of it).
293. I 9 F.3d 102, 1O5 (2d Cir. 1997).
294. Id. at 105.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 802 (6th Cir. i996). The court said that the plaintiff's
complaining about this selection criterion supports just the stereotype the ADEA was trying to change
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experience, 99 pension benefits,"°° and seniority as evidence of age
discrimination.3"' While all of these factors may have valid uses as
employment criteria in a particular situation, in the absence of a
requirement that they be justified as a reasonable requirement for the
job, such factors can be used to accomplish the wholesale elimination of
older workers.
VII. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED SOLUTION
Many employers suppose that older workers are less productive
because they often make more money than their younger counterparts.
This phenomenon is explained as the life cycle of productivity, which
hypothesizes that workers are overpaid when first hired and underpaid
when they gain experience. When they have been in the workforce a long
time, workers are overpaid again because they are paid more than
similarly performing workers who have been in the workforce less
time."°
The supposition that older workers make too much money leads to
what some authors term "opportunistic" terminations. 3  These
opportunistic terminations cause problems the ADEA was designed to
prevent. As one author noted:
A profit maximizing employer who decides to downsize highly paid
late-career employees will be motivated to terminate their positions
because their salaries and benefits will likely exceed their current
productivity. However, because these employees have worked hard
during their careers and have invested in their own job training by
accepting lower wages during their initial employment with the firm,
they have "earned" the higher pay that they receive later in their
career. They are thus earning an "efficient" wage and are not really
being "overpaid." These employees are entitled to the benefit of the
bargain, and the employer should not be permitted to renege on an
implicit promise establishing the long-term relationship and thereby
take unfair advantage of the employees' vulnerable position created by
and, standing alone, it is insufficient to support a prima facie case. Id. at 803.
298. See e.g., Turney v. Beltservice Corp., No. 95-35063, 1996 WL 436511, at *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 2,
1996). The court said that discrimination could not be inferred because the plaintiff was fired for high
salary and replaced by a "younger, cheaper" worker. Id. See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 125-26 (7th Cir. 1994).
In Tichenor v. Sec'y of Army, No. 98-5244, 1999 WL 357813, at *3 (6th Cir. May 27, 1999), the
plaintiff used the factor of "recent education" and attempted to show a disparate impact case. He was
unsuccessful, but if disparate impact were not available, the employer could use such a factor that
clearly adversely impacts older workers without justifying it.
299. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., Nos. 92-4042 & 92-4074, 1993 WL 503736, at
*5 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1993).
300. See, e.g., Borza v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., Nos. 94-1092, 94-1268 & 94-1269, 1995 WL 8oi6, at *2
(4th Cir. Jan. 1o, 1995).
301. See, e.g., Lubeck v. Comet Die & Engraving Co., 848 F. Supp. 783, 790-79 (N.D. I11. 1994).
302. See, e.g., Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 7, at 789.
303. Id. at 790.
[Vol. 55:1399
June 2004] REHABILITATE THE ADEA 1445
substantial performance over years of service.3"
One counterargument to this point is that employers were willing to
"overpay" older workers because they could be mandatorily retired at
some point. Because this is no longer possible,3 5 some employers may
fear being unable to get rid of employees who are being "overpaid,"
according to the life cycle of productivity theory. In other words,
eliminating the ability of employers to retire workers mandatorily at a
certain age without cause may encourage employers to terminate older
workers at the first opportunity.' It may be that if employers could be
sure that employees would not work long past the time of their perceived
decreased productivity, employers might be more likely to retain older
workers. Perhaps allowing mandatory retirement at some elevated age,
such as seventy-five, that could be adjusted to account for increasing
longevity, would be a partial solution to the problem of opportunistic
terminations.
There is no question that the life cycle of productivity is a
generalization about older employees that may not be borne out in a
particular situation, but which nevertheless is affecting older employees.
A worker who has more experience may be receiving an efficient wageY
Adverse actions by employers based on the assumption that older
employees are not worth their wages also present a question of morality.
This question was addressed in part by the ADEA, which explicitly
prohibits opportunistic behavior on the part of employers, except under
certain circumstances. For example, an employer cannot expressly use
the employee's age as a proxy for other characteristics, such as quick
reactions, without justifying it as a BFOQ."9 It is unlikely that Congress
intended to allow the employer to circumvent the protections of the
ADEA by designing an age-correlated criterion that would serve the
same function as explicitly using age, but would not require some
justification. The courts, however, are holding otherwise by requiring
that only the explicit use of age has to be justified.
The ADEA must be rehabilitated in this regard by reviving the two
interrelated components of the proposed solution that until Hazen Paper
were being used by the courts to prevent opportunistic terminations and
other methods of excluding older workers from the workforce. The first
component is that the disparate impact theory should apply to the
304. Minda, supra note i, at 530.
305. Mandatory retirement is no longer allowed under the ADEA, as amended by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), too Stat. 3342,
3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2ooo)), except in limited circumstances. See Western
Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,422-23 (1985).
306. See Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 7, at 820-25.
307. See, e.g., id. These authors do not recommend a reinstitution of mandatory retirement, but
rather other reforms to compensate for decreased productivity of older employers.
308. See, e.g., Minda, supra note i, at 528.
309. See, e.g., Western Airlines, 472 U.S. at 411-12.
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ADEA and the second is that the RFOA defense should prohibit the use
of age-correlated factors that enable opportunistic firings and other
targeting of older workers, unless the employer can justify cutting costs
by burdening older workers. RFOA should be the defense to disparate
impact and to certain types of disparate treatment cases. While this is not
a perfect solution, it is the only likely one.
With regard to disparate impact, the plaintiff should be required to
show a prima facie case as required by Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio."° That is, the plaintiff must pick out the criterion causing the
discrimination and demonstrate a statistically significant disparate impact
on older employees. At that point, the employer must justify the use of
the factor as an RFOA. Some scholars and courts have suggested that
definition of the class is the problem with applying the disparate impact
theory to the ADEA. I' Not all age-correlated factors affect the entire
class, but certainly affect a substantial and definable part of the class,
such as "approaching... retirement age.....2  As the Court said in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., the question is whether
the discrimination is based on age, not whether the whole protected
group is affected."1 Although O'Connor is a disparate treatment case, the
same rationale should apply to disparate impact cases. If the criterion has
a significant impact on some definable part of the protected class, this
showing should be enough to shift the burden of persuasion to the
employer to show RFOA.
What should the employer have to show to prove RFOA? Under the
Equal Pay Act, most lower courts require the employer to justify using a
310. See discussion supra accompanying note 245.
311. See supra note 224 for discussion of the difficulty of defining the class under the ADEA. The
problem is whether the plaintiff can prove disparate impact by showing, for example, that a criterion
impacts persons fifty-five and older or whether the plaintiff has to prove that the criterion has a
disparate impact on persons over forty. Compare Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 11o4, 1129 (D.
Del. 1994), with Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1373 (2d Cir. 1989). The
Finch court stated:
[Flailure to accord protection to subsets of the protected class would allow an employer to
adopt facially neutral policies which had a profoundly disparate impact on individuals over
age 5o or 55, so long as persons under age 50 or 55 received sufficiently favorable treatment
that the adverse impact on individuals over 40 was minimal.
865 F. Supp. at I129. On the other hand, the Lowe court contended that dividing up the protected class
bypasses the plain language of the ADEA which protects the entire class of persons between forty and
seventy. 886 F.2d at 1373. The Second Circuit continues to adhere to this position. See, e.g., Criley v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 1i9 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997).
312. See, e.g., Criley, iI 9 F.3 d at lo5.
313. 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). "The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to
another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age."
Id.
The Court has also recently decided that the ADEA does not forbid discrimination against
younger members in the protected group in favor of older members in the protected group. Gen.
Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1239, 1248-49 (20o4). "The ADEA was concerned
to protect a relatively old worker from discrimination that works to the advantage of the relatively
young." Id. at 1248.
REHABILITATE THE ADEA
factor that correlates with sex in order to succeed on the "any other
factor other than sex" defense, from which RFOA was derived.1 4 RFOA
should be interpreted to require at least as much justification. For
example, if the employer is cutting costs, this should not be enough to
satisfy his burden. Rather, the employer should prove a business reason
for burdening older workers in his economizing. As the Secretary of
Labor, who was originally responsible for administering the ADEA, said
shortly after the ADEA was enacted: To be an RFOA, the criterion must
be "reasonably necessary for the specific work to be performed' or
'shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements. '315
Arguments have been made that RFOA should be equated with
business necessity as expressed in Wards Cove 6 which would require
that the employer merely articulate "whether a practice serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer. 31 7 As
I have argued throughout this article, however, RFOA is the statutorily-
mandated affirmative defense in the ADEA, and it should be applied as
originally understood to defend the use of age-correlated criteria.
Similarly, with regard to disparate treatment, if a factor obviously
correlates with age, the employer should bear the burden of persuasion
to show RFOA.3"5 Also, RFOA should be the defense in any other
situation in which the employer bears the burden of persuasion, such as
cases involving direct evidence or a pattern or practice discrimination. 3'9
In other cases of disparate treatment, where the plaintiff can show only a
bare prima facie case that satisfies McDonnell Douglas,20 the burdens of
proof and persuasion from that case should continue to be applied. Thus,
if the plaintiff can only show that he is a member of the protected class
and was not hired, he should have to bear the burden of persuasion to
show that he was discriminated against based on age.
While the typical ADEA plaintiff is portrayed as a white male in
management in his fifties, women and minorities are just now getting to
that age in management and that picture has changed.3"' Now that sex
and race discrimination are somewhat ameliorated, will minorities and
women lose the places they have gained because of their ages?
314. See supra Section V.A.2.a.
315. Kaminshine, supra note 13, at 302-03.
316. See Eglit, supra note 57, at 1215.
317. 490 U.S. 642
, 
659 (1989), superseded in part by statute.
318. See discussion supra accompanying notes 136-63.
319. See supra note 18o.
320. See discussion supra accompanying notes 158-63.
321. See Eglit, supra note 3, at 6o9. Professor Eglit noted that in the first years of the ADEA, only
16% of the plaintiffs were women. Id. at 613. As of 1996, that percentage had risen to 32% women and
has probably risen higher by now. Id. The data as to race of the claimants was not available. Id.
Professor Eglit accounts for this increase in women claimants not only because of the rise of women in
the workforce, but also because women are more willing to sue and have greater resources with which
to do so. Id. at 612.
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If the Supreme Court decides that the disparate impact theory does
not apply to the ADEA, the present trend will continue. Older workers
will find themselves in the same position they occupied when Congress
passed the ADEA in 1967 and commented that because "the incidence
of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant
deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to
the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are great and
growing; and their employment problems grave.''322
322. ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2oo0).
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